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Why Who Does What Matters:
Governmental Design, Agency Performance, the CFPB and PPACA
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic1
Abstract
How should the federal government be organized – and who (i.e., which
departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what? The
issue is not new: President James Madison addressed governmental
organization in his 1812 State of the Union Address, and in the last century,
it is the rare President that does not propose to reorganize some part of the
federal government. Indeed, on numerous occasions during the past century,
virtually every part of the federal government has been repeatedly
reorganized and reconfigured. In previous work, we examined the dynamics
that influence the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those
dynamics (and the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and
how the specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes affect
agency decision-making. In this article, we focus on the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Using the framework we developed
in our previous work, we examine the costs and benefits of the design
choices made by the architects of the CFPB, and make some (appropriately
hedged) predictions about the future prospects of this latest addition to the
federal bureaucracy. We also briefly consider the implications of our
analysis for the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“PPACA”).
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We live and do business in the Information Age, but the
last major reorganization of the government happened in the
age of black-and-white TV. There are 12 different agencies
that deal with exports. There are at least five different
agencies that deal with housing policy. Then there’s my
favorite example: The Interior Department is in charge of
salmon while they’re in fresh water, but the Commerce
Department handles them when they’re in saltwater. I hear it
gets even more complicated once they’re smoked.
President Barack Obama (2011)2
There are four different kinds of bears in the United
States, and, of course, all these bears come under the
jurisdiction of one Government department or another. I
think it is the brown bear that comes under the jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior, and I think the black bear
comes under the Department of Agriculture; and the Alaska
bear comes under the Department of Commerce; and
jurisdiction over the grizzly bear is held by the Department
of War. That has been going on from time immemorial in
Washington. Each bear - the care of the bear and everything
else about the bear - falls under a different department,
depending on the genus of the bear. And I am told
confidentially that sometimes there is a most awful mixup,
because sometimes a black bear falls in love with a brown
bear, and then nobody knows under what department the
puppies belong.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1928)3
If we shouldn’t have twelve agencies dealing with exports, and five
agencies dealing with housing policy, and two departments dealing with
salmon, and four agencies dealing with bears, then how many agencies and
departments (and which ones) should be responsible for exports, housing,
salmon, and bears? Does it really matter whether salmon are the sole
responsibility of the Department of Interior (Fish & Wildlife Service) or the
2

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Jan. 25, 2011, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-unionaddress
3
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Extemporaneous Campaign Address, Binghamton, N.Y.,
Oct. 17, 1928, available at 1 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 16
(1938).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319466
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Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”))? What difference would it make if Interior and
Commerce were stripped of responsibility for salmon, and sole authority
was assigned to the Food & Drug Administration (currently responsible for
salmon once it is packaged) or the Department of Agriculture (which is
responsible for catfish)? And, while we’re at it, why is NOAA in the
Department of Commerce, and why is regulatory authority over catfish in
the Department of Agriculture? More broadly, even if these particular
allocations of responsibility are not optimal, might there be some utility in
shared or overlapping authority/responsibility – and if so, under what
circumstances?
These issues are policy perennials. 4 President James Madison
addressed governmental organization in his 1812 State of the Union
Address,5 and over the course of the last century, it is the rare President that
does not propose to reorganize at least some part of the federal
government.67
4

Cf. Gary L. Wamsley, et al. Bureaucracy in Democratic Governance, 80-81 in THE
STATE OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, Larry B. Hill, ed. (1992) (observing that reorganization
is the “cod liver oil of government--an all purpose cure for whatever ails the body politic.”)
5
President James Madison, State of the Union Address, Nov. 4, 1812, at
http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/24.html (“I can not press too strongly
on the earliest attention of the Legislature the importance of the reorganization of the staff
[military] establishment with a view to render more distinct and definite the relations and
responsibilities of its several departments. That there is room for improvements which will
materially promote both economy and success in what appertains to the Army and the war
is equally inculcated by the examples of other countries and by the experience of our
own.”)
6
Peri E. Arnold, Reforms Changing Role, 55 PUB. ADMIN. L. REV. (1995) (“President
Clinton is the thirteenth president in this century to initiate or embrace comprehensive
reorganization or reform, using those terms interchangeably.”) See also Peri E. Arnold,
Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1996
(University Press of Kansas, 1998).
More specifically, President Franklin Roosevelt conducted a bruising multi-year fight
to reorganize the federal government, culminating with the creation of the Federal Security
Agency. President Truman oversaw the unification of the Department of the Navy and the
Department of War under a single Department of Defense in 1949. President Johnson
oversaw the creation of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and
Transportation. President Nixon proposed to reorganize seven departments (Agriculture,
Commerce, Health, Education & Welfare, Housing & Urban Development, Interior, and
Labor) into four super-departments organized along functional lines (Community
Development, Economic Resources, Human Resources, and Natural Resources), and was
responsible for the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. President Carter
oversaw the creation of the Departments of Energy and Education, and also proposed two
additional Departments – a Department of Development Assistance, and a Department of
Natural Resources. President George W. Bush oversaw the merger of components of
twenty-two separate agencies into the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) -- which

3
President Obama called for governmental reorganization in both the
2011 and 2012 State of the Union Addresses, and recently proposed the
creation of a single cabinet-level department responsible for “boosting
American business and promoting competitiveness.” 8 President Obama
also oversaw the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010, which shuttered one
agency (the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)) and merged its functions
into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and created a new
bureau within the Federal Reserve (the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”)).9
Reorganization has also figured in presidential campaigns and
primaries. President Carter ran on a platform of reorganizing government.
And, during the 2012 presidential primaries, four of the Republican
candidates promised to “reorganize” parts of the federal government.
Governor Rick Perry committed to eliminate three cabinet-level
departments, but memorably could only come up with two departments
(Education and Commerce) when asked during a November, 2011 debate.10
Representatives Newt Gingrich and Michele Bachman both promised to
shutter the EPA.11 Representative Ron Paul wanted to close five federal
departments: Education, Commerce, Energy, Interior and Housing and
Urban Development.12
To summarize, on numerous occasions during the past century,
virtually every part of the federal government has been reorganized and
reconfigured. In the process, entire departments, agencies, bureaus and
commissions have been created, moved, consolidated, divided, turned
was itself reorganized two years later. For details, see generally THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
(JOEL D. ABERBACH & MARK A. PETERSON, EDS. (2005).
7
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm
8
Matt Compton, Making It Easier to Do Business in America,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/13/making-it-easier-do-business-america; Mark
Landler, Obama to Ask Congress for Power to Merge Agencies, N.Y. Times A1 (Jan. 13,
2012); Binyamin Applebaum & Helene Cooper, White House Debates Fight on Economy,
N.Y. TIMES A1 (Aug. 13, 2011).
9
http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/ots-bowman-dodd-frank-2669814-1.html
10
Ed O’Keefe, What Do The Departments of Commerce, Education and Energy think
of Rick Perry’s plan? WASH POST FEDERAL EYE, Nov. 10, 2011 at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/what-do-the-departments-ofcommerce-education-and-energy-think-of-rick-perrysplan/2011/11/10/gIQAXiSe8M_blog.html. See also Mark Schmitt, Let’s Get Real, No
One’s Eliminating Any Cabinet Departments, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 2011, at
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/97327/perry-debate-oops-cabinet-energy-commerce
11
John Broder, Bashing EPA is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2011, at A1.
12
Ron Paul, 2012 Restore America Now, at http://www.ronpaul2012.com/theissues/ron-paul-plan-to-restore-america/.
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upside down and inside out, and infrequently eliminated entirely.13 Interagency working groups, coordinators, and “czars” have come and gone,
along with multiple shifts in responsibility for particular firms, industries,
and areas of law.
Why all this fuss over organization? Simply stated, what an agency
is assigned to do and where it is located matters. As Professor Amy Zegart
aptly observed:
organization is never neutral. As any Washington taxi
driver can point out, government organization has serious
implications for policy outcomes. It matters who has the
information, who has the jurisdiction, who has the last word.
It matters whether intelligence is collected by diplomats or
spies, whether international negotiations are conducted
through the Department of State or through back channels in
the White House. . . When it comes to selecting, shaping,
and implementing. . . policy, the devil often lies in the details
of agency design.14
In previous work, we analyzed the dynamics that influence the
assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and the
allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the specific
combination of regulatory functions and purposes can affect agency
behavior. 15 In this article, we apply the framework we previously
developed to the CFPB. Created as a result of the 2011 Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the CFPB is an independent
entity within the Federal Reserve, with responsibility for consumer
protection in financial products and services. Combining issues that had
previously been handled by seven different federal agencies, the CFPB has
regulatory oversight over banks, credit unions, securities firms, mortgage-

13

Donald F. Kettl, Reforming the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, 345, 346,
Table 1 in Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6; RONALD C. MOE, ADMINISTRATIVE
RENEWAL: REORGANIZATION COMMISSIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2003).
14
AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC
I-II (1999).
15
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy
Portfolios:
Divide
or
Conquer?
2013
Concurrences,
available
at
http://www.concurrences.com/Journal/Issues/No-1-2013/Articles/Competition-agencieswith-complex; William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design:
What’s On the Menu? 8 European Comp. J. 527-538 (2013). See also David A. Hyman &
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and The Goals of
Competition Law, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2163-2174 (2013).
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servicers, payday lenders, debt collectors, and other financial companies.16
The CFPB has a diverse array of tools available to prevent “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive” acts or practices in the financial services sector.
The CFPB has been mired in controversy since it was first proposed,
including disputes over how it should be structured, where it should be
located within the federal bureaucracy, and what powers it should exercise.
Because our past work helps cast light on these issues, we analyze the
CFPB as a case study of the complexities and contingencies of agency
design.
Part II provides a historical perspective on the complexities of
designing a public agency. Part III introduces our analytical framework for
analyzing the problem of agency design. Part IV specifies seven factors that
we believe have proven significant in the success (and failure) of various
past combinations of functions. Part V applies our analytical framework to
the CFPB. Part VI considers two other issues: the implications of our
findings for administrative law, and for the design of other entities. Part VII
concludes.
II. Designing a Regulatory Agency: Who, What and Where?
How should the federal government be organized – and who (i.e.,
which departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what?
When a law is passed, should responsibility for enforcing it be given to an
existing department, agency, bureau, or commission -- and, if so, which
one? If responsibility is given to a new department, agency, bureau, or
commission, where should it be located in the bureaucratic firmament?
The examples in President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union
(exports, housing, and salmon) suggest that these organizational issues are
straightforward, and that inefficiencies are specific and isolated. Indeed, the
graphic that accompanied the on-line version of the State of the Union,
reproduced below as Figure 1, suggests that the problem is a bit of a joke,
and that is easily remedied once it is recognized as a problem. In fact, as
detailed below, the duplication and “jurisdictional chaos” that give rise to
the demand for government reorganization are policy perennials.

16

The seven agencies are the Federal Reserve Board; the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of Thrift Supervision;
the National Credit Union Administration; the Federal Trade Commission; and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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Figure 1: Allocation of Regulatory Responsibility for Salmon

Source: 2011 Enhanced State of the Union Address Graphics,
slide 54, available at http://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/2011enhanced-state-of-the-union-address-graphics
A.
How Frequent and Severe is the Problem?
The problem identified by President Obama in his 2011 and 2012
State of the Union Addresses is pervasive and longstanding, and it has
proven remarkably resistant (if not completely immune) to repeated reform
efforts. Over the past century, numerous public and private blue-ribbon
commissions, task forces, advisory councils and working groups have
studied how to reorganize the federal government. The conclusions of the
National Commission on Public Service in 2003 are typical:
The federal government is a flotilla of many distinct
organizational units. Virtually every year new vessels are
added to respond to the demands of the time. Occasionally,
in response to a broadly perceived national emergency, the
vessels are regrouped. . . Virtually never are they combined
to eliminate program duplication. Missions are not realigned
or even rationalized. Program laps upon program.
Responsibilities are not coordinated. . .Those who enter
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public service often find themselves at sea in an archipelago
of agencies and departments that have grown without logical
structure, deterring intelligent policymaking. The
organization and operations of the federal government are a
mixture of the outdated, the outmoded and the outworn.17
The 2003 Volcker report provides some concrete examples of the
magnitude of the problem:
Prior to the post 9/11 reorganizations, over 40 federal
agencies were involved in activities to combat terrorism. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development operates 23
self-sufficiency and economic opportunity programs that
target tenants of public housing and other low-income
clients. Responsibility for federal drug control strategies and
their implementation is fragmented among more than 50
federal agencies. There are over 90 early childhood programs
scattered among 11 federal agencies and 20 offices. Nine
federal agencies administer 69 programs supporting
education and care for children under age five. There are 342
federal
economic
development
related
programs
administered by 13 of the 14 cabinet departments. Seven
agencies administer 40 different programs that have job
training as their main purpose. At least 86 teacher-training
programs in nine federal agencies fund similar types of
services. . . There are 50 homeless assistance programs
administered by eight agencies. . . 29 agencies collectively
share responsibility for federal clean air, clean and safe
water, and better waste management programs.18
Analogous paragraphs can readily be found in the reports issued by blue
ribbon commissions, task forces, and other entities over the course of the
20th century.19 Yet, despite regular reorganizations, the problems persist –
17

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PUBLIC SERVICE, URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA:
REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf
(hereinafter
“Volcker
Commission”), at 36.
18
Volcker Commission, supra note 17, at 36-37.
19
Taft, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton used
advisory commissions to review the structure and performance of the federal government.
The GAO has also issued periodic reports on the problem of duplication. Government
Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (March 2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP. A 2012 report from the GAO
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and, if anything, have gotten worse over time.20
Ironically enough, given the after FDR’s 1939 reorganization of the
federal government, he had to resolve a dispute over which of two
Departments (Interior and Agriculture) should have jurisdiction over the
breeding and raising of fur bearing animals.21 Roosevelt settled the dispute
with a tongue-in-cheek note that referenced the story of the four bears.22
President Roosevelt had to deal with such issues on other
occasions, including turf battles between the FBI and the Office of
Coordinator of Information (“OCI”), and the FBI and the Office of
Strategic Services (“OSS”). 23 For example, when OSS agents
burglarized the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C. in October,
1942, the FBI sent two cars to the embassy, arrested the OSS agents,
and sought to bring criminal charges -- jeopardizing the security
interests of the United States in order to protect its turf.24 Although
the OSS was ultimately replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency,
the turf war has continued to the present day.25
noted that some progress had been made, but most of the organizational chaos remained.
Government Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Feb. 2012), at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf.
20
On the frequency of reorganization, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 212 (2000) (“During the 1960s, 270
federal offices were created, 109 were abolished, 61 were transferred, and 109 had their
names changed. From 1953 to 1970 the Office of Education was reorganized six times and
the Food and Drug Administration eight times.”)
21
In 1939, the Bureau of Biological Survey (Agriculture) and the Bureau of Fisheries
(Commerce) were transferred to Interior to form the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The
American Fox and Fur Breeders Association proposed to have fur-animal research
(previously handled by the Bureau of Biological Survey) transferred back from Interior to
Agriculture. HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 88 (Oxford U. Press,
1970).
22
See Id:
I agree with the Secty of the Interior. Please have it carried out so
that fur-bearing animals remain in the Dept. of Interior. You might find
out if any Alaska bears are still supervised by a) War Dept., b) Dept. of
Agric. c) Dept. of Commerce. They have all had jurisdiction over Alaska
bears in the past and many embarrassing situations have been created by
the mating of a bear belonging to one Dept. with a bear belonging to
another Dept.
P.S. I don't think the Navy is involved, but it may be. Check the
Coast Guard. You never can tell.)
We are indebted to Alvin Felzenberger for calling this episode to our attention.
23
FRANCIS MCDONNELL, INSIDIOUS FOES: THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN AND THE
AMERICAN HOME FRONT 170-171 (Oxford, 1995).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11: HOW THE
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More recent examples are easy to find. Why do 15 federal agencies
share responsibility for food safety – with the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) responsible for cheese pizza, and the Department
of Agriculture responsible for pepperoni pizza? 26 Why is the FDA
responsible for bottled water, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) responsible for tap water?27 Why is the safety of drinking water
on airlines jointly regulated by three federal agencies, with the
determination of the responsible agency contingent on where the water is
physically located, and the form that it takes (e.g., is it bottled water, tap
water, or ice, coffee and tea)?28 Why are federal financial literacy efforts
“spread among more than 20 different agencies and more than 50 different
programs and initiatives”?29 Why does regulatory responsibility for eggs
bounce between the FDA (Department of Health & Human Services) and
the Department of Agriculture, depending on whether the egg is inside or
outside of the chicken, and whether or not the egg is in the shell, or has
been cracked open?30 How many Institutes should there be in the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), and should they be organized around specific
diseases, organ systems, life stage, field of science, or the
profession/technology?31 Why is the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) located within the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) instead of NIH or within the Department
of Labor? 32 Why do four federal agencies have authority over outer
SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE CIA HAS ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY
(2002).
26
Jane Black & Ed O’Keefe, Overhaul of Food Safety Rules in the Works, WASH.
POST, July 8, 2009.
27
General Accounting Office, Bottled Water: FDA Safety and Consumer Protections
Are Often Less Stringent Than Comparable EPA Protections For Tap Water (June, 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09610.pdf.
28
EPA,
Aircraft
Water
Drinking
Rule,
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/sdwa/airlinewater/regs.cfm.
See
also
http://aircrewhealth.com/Topics/hazards/waterquality.htm.
29
GAO, Financial Literacy: The Federal Government's Role in Empowering
Americans
to
Make
Sound
Financial
Choices,
GAO
11-504T,
at
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11504thigh.pdf
30
Karen Tumulty & Ed O’Keefe, The Government tends to resist reorganization,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan 28, 2011, at A1.
31
As it happens, NIH has institutes organized around all of the above possibilities.
There are nine disease-focused institutes; four organ system-focused Institutes; two
Institutes focused on life stage; three Institutes focused on a particular field of science; and
two Institutes that focus on a specific profession or technology. See Michael McGeary &
Philip M. Smith, Organizational Structure of the National Institutes of Health, unpublished
background paper on file with authors (2002)
32
Congress put NIOSH in HHS (then HEW), rather than Labor to distance it from the
“highly political workplace enforcement environment.” Denny Dobbin, Where to Put
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space?33 Why did the State Department engage in a decades-long dispute
with the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce over which department
should be responsible for federal employees stationed outside the United
States (usually within foreign embassies) who handled agriculture and trade
promotion?34
Why is the FDA responsible for both food and drugs, when there is
effectively no real overlap between these two industries, other than for
some dietary supplements? Why is NOAA in the Department of Commerce
and the Coast Guard in the Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S.
Public Health Service in the Department of Health & Human Services,
when all three include significant uniformed services, like the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marines (all of which reside in the Department of Defense)?
And, even if NOAA doesn’t belong in the Department of Defense,
shouldn’t there be a better reason for why is it in the Department of
Commerce than President Nixon’ personal pique at the then-Secretary of
the Interior (which was the leading candidate for housing NOAA when it
was created)?35 Why is the U.S. Forest Service (and responsibility for
NIOSH, MEDSCAPE PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE, May 31, 2005, at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/504483. Stated more concretely, there was a
fundamental dispute between those who wanted the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) to aggressively regulate workplace health and safety and those
who didn’t want there to be an OSHA at all. One part of the resulting compromise was the
creation of two separate agencies (NIOSH and OSHA), put in two different departments
(HHS and Labor, respectively), with NIOSH responsible for making recommendations to
OSHA on workplace health and safety standards, and OSHA responsible for bringing
enforcement actions and promulgating regulations. This structure effectively constrained
OSHA’s ability to set its own regulatory agenda, since it could not do its own research on
workplace safety. But see Andy Morriss & Susan Graham, Defining What to Regulate:
Silica & the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 322-23 (2006)
(“This separation of standard setting and enforcement from research ‘has its roots in the
history of earlier occupational safety and health activities and conflicts between the
Department of Labor and the Public Health Service.’”)
When one of us (DAH) presented this paper, he asked the audience to vote where they
thought NIOSH belonged (without revealing where it was currently located). Given the
choice between the three locations in the text, the overwhelming majority voted to put it in
the Department of Labor. Not one person voted to put NIOSH in the CDC.
33
Tumulty & O’Keefe, supra note 30.
34
On the dispute between State and Commerce, see MAURICE STANS, ONE OF THE
PRESIDENTS’ MEN: TWENTY YEARS WITH EISENHOWER AND NIXON 212-214 (1995). See
also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Agricultural_Service
35
See Steven Eli Schanes, The Battle for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) 1969-71, at http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/the-battlefor-the-national-oceanic-and-atmospheric-administration-noaa/. See also Steven Eli
Schanes,
Putting
NOAA
Together- 1970,
at
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/putting-noaa-together-1970/; and Eileen L. Shea,
A History of NOAA, at http://www.history.noaa.gov/legacy/noaahistory_1.html
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National Forests) in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park
Service (and responsibility for National Parks) in the Department of the
Interior, when the territory being supervised is physically contiguous?36
Why have the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) gotten into turf battles at crime scenes, even
though they are both located within the Department of Justice?37 Why,
when President Obama proposed to move NOAA from Commerce to
Interior was the move opposed by both environmentalists and fisheries?38
Similar difficulties were created by President Obama’s proposal in
the 2012 State of the Union Address to move the U.S. Trade Representative
(“USTR”) from its current location within the Executive Office of the
President (“EOP”) into the proposed business and trade agency. Trade is a
focal point for inter-agency conflict, with each agency emphasizing the
issues of most important to its constituents: “Commerce Department
officials continually urged U.S. trade negotiators to take a pro-business
position, while State Department officials said that non-business foreign
policy matters should determine whether the United States wanted to pursue
an agreement or a liberalization or tightening up of trade rules.”39 USTR’s
position in the EOP allows it to serve a trade coordination function, but
subsuming it within a larger super-trade bureaucracy placed this role (and
USTR’s flexibility and autonomy) at risk. 40 Not surprisingly, USTR’s
“clients” opposed the relocation/merger.41
36

For the largely historical answer, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). See also HOWARD SEIDMAN, POLITICS,
POSITIONS AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION 126 (5th ed. 1998)
(“The Forest Service might well be in the Interior Department today if the historic dispute
between Secretary Ballinger and Gifford Pinchot had not left conservationists with a nearly
pathological distrust of the department.”)
37
Tumulty & O’Keefe, supra note 30.
38
Charles S. Clark, Obama reorganization bid faces challenges on Capitol Hill, Jan.
13, 2012, available at http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/01/obama-reorganizationbid-faces-challenges-on-capitol-hill/35839/; Press Release, Fishermen wary of Obama’s
reforms, Fishnewseu.com, Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://www.fishnewseu.com/latestnews/world/7378-fishermen-wary-of-obamas-reforms.html.
39
Reorganization Proposal could impact food safety, USTR, Hagstrom Report,
available
at
http://www.hagstromreport.com/2012news_files/2012_0113_reorganization.html
40
Daniel F. Runde & Meredith Broadbent, President’s Proposed Reorganization of
Trade Agencies, Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://csis.org/publication/presidents-proposeddepartment-trade-and-innovation.
41
Those opposing the relocation/merger included two dairy associations (the U.S.
Dairy Export Council and the National Milk Producers Federation) and the American
Soybean Association. See USDEC, NMPF raise concerns about U.S. trade policy
reorganization impact, http://dairybusiness.com/seo/headline.php?title=usdec-nmpf-raise-
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The division of “ownership” over particular areas can result in
problems when separate agencies share jurisdiction, and/or must coordinate
their efforts.42 Profound difficulties can result when agencies do not “get
along” or have conflicting assessments of the nature and seriousness of the
“problem.”43 Even when agencies “get along” and agree on the nature and
seriousness of the problem, they can have profound disagreements on the
optimal solution, and which of the rival agencies is best situated to
implement “reform.” Conflicts within intelligence agencies, and between
intelligence and law enforcement agencies are legendary. 44 A trivial
example makes the point: when top brass at the CIA and FBI announced
that analysts from each would be detailed to the other, so as to break down
these barriers, personnel at both agencies referred to it as a “hostage
exchange program.”45 As detailed below, inter-service conflicts within the
Department of Defense are deeply rooted. Even the children of military
personnel are rapidly socialized into the tribal nature of the individual
services.46
One final complication: all of these examples assume the allocation
of regulatory responsibility is static – but history makes it clear that the
location of any given agency/bureau/regulatory function is actually quite
fluid. The frequency of past reorganizations means that the “home” of any
given function is far from permanent, and “it does not take much digging
concerns-about-u-s-trade-pol&date=2012-01-17&table=headlines (
42
See generally Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181
(2011).
43
In re Aiken County, -- F.3d –, No. 10-1050 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This case is a mess
because the executive agency (the Department of Energy) and the independent agency (the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) have overlapping statutory responsibilities with respect
to the Yucca Mountain project.”)
44
See AMY B. ZEGERT, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11
(2007); Riebling, supra note 25; Luis Garicano and Richard Posner, What Our Spies Can
Learn From Toyota, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2010) (“The national intelligence apparatus of
the U.S. . . consists officially of 16 separate agencies, and unofficially of more than 20.
Each of these agencies is protected by strong political and bureaucratic constituencies, so
that after each intelligence failure everything continues pretty much the same and usually
with the same people in charge.”)
45
John Diamond, CIA & FBI in the Hot Seat, USA TODAY, June, 4, 2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002/06/04/hotseat-usat.htm
(“As
an
illustration of the bad feelings between the two agencies, the practice of CIA and FBI
analysts working at the other agency is referred to as a "hostage exchange program.”)
46
MARY ELLEN WERTSCH, MILITARY BRATS: LEGACIES OF CHILDHOOD INSIDE THE
FORTRESS 311, 312 (2006) (“When I was a young child, I understood that we were
something called an ‘Army family’ although I had only a vague idea of what that meant.
But I knew one thing for certain: We were most definitely not Navy. . . One Army
colonel’s daughter told me her father refused to attend her wedding because she was
marrying a Navy brat.”)
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for an organization archeologist to uncover evidence of prior civilizations
and cultures within the Executive branch.” 47 Further, even completely
“new” agencies and bureaus are usually cobbled together from “bits and
pieces” of other agencies and bureaus.48 As Professor Daniel Carpenter
observed, “the institutions of the future seem endlessly created from the
organization of the past.”49 As we discuss in greater depth below, these
complicated genealogies are the result of a polycentric, path-dependent, and
intensely political process -- played out repeatedly, over many decades.50
But, before we turn to a more systematic consideration of factors that affect
the location and combination of functions for a public agency, Part C
explains how the focus on “jurisdictional chaos” misses some of the gains
from agency/regulatory duplication and overlap.
C.
Benefits of Agency Redundancy
Framing the problem as “jurisdictional chaos” is rhetorically
effective. After all, who could be in favor of chaos?51 But, if one unweights
the rhetorical dice, and asks about the costs and benefits of
agency/regulatory redundancy, the issue suddenly becomes less clear-cut. In
an engineering context, redundancy is usually viewed as an essential
attribute in creating a margin of safety. Although the Boeing 777 can fly on
only one engine, no one thinks Boeing should just leave the second engine
off.52 Computer users are supposed to back up their computer files – even
though doing so is, by definition, redundant. As these simple examples
47

Seidman, supra note 36, at 126.
Wilson, supra note 20, at 55 (“Most new agencies are formed out of bits and pieces
of old ones.”)
49
Daniel Carpenter, The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States, in
ABERBACH &. PETERSON, supra note 6, at 41, 43 (New agencies are “built from existing
agencies and institutions. The institutions of the future seem endlessly created from the
organization of the past.”)
50
See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure: A Perspective on
Structural Politics, Self-Interest, and the New Social Regulation, in Can the Government
Govern (John E. Chubb & Paul Peterson, eds.) (Brookings, 1989) (“American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its
design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political
power.”); Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the
Political-Bureaucratic System, in Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6, at 312, 315 (“Ex
ante constraints are designed to mirror the political environment facing the enacting
coalition and to stack the deck in favor of particular interests and to disadvantage others.”)
51
But see Heathers (1988) (“Chaos was what killed the dinosaurs, darling.”) Similar
rhetorical tactics explain other labels, such as “smart growth” and “death taxes.”
52
Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice and Public Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, D. Farber & A. O’Connell, eds. (2010),
at 351 (“[R]edundancy is a standard design principle in both engineering and
organizations.”)
48
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illustrate, it is more useful to think about these issues in terms of the optimal
level of agency and regulatory redundancy/overlap – a framing which
necessarily requires balancing the costs and benefits of such strategies
compared to the alternatives. The costs of redundancy/overlap are quite
visible, and have attracted considerable attention. So, what are the benefits
of redundancy/overlap? More broadly, what explains the agency design
choices that we actually observe?
In recent years, a number of legal scholars have focused on these
issues – usually in the context of disputes involving a single statute, agency,
or substantive area of law. Professor Freeman and co-authors have outlined
various ways in which the involvement of multiple agencies can influence
agency decision-making for the better, by encouraging or requiring the
“deciding agency” to take account of factors and goals it would otherwise
downplay or ignore.53 Professors Weisbach & Nussim argue that we should
consider tax preferences and spending programs in an integrated fashion,
and highlight the organizational logic (focusing on specialization and
coordination) of having overlapping programs run by separate agencies.54
Professor Bradley suggests that the division of responsibilities between
agencies, when coupled with a “rule-based interface,” helps coordinate
resolution of complex regulatory problems and strengthens presidential
control of the administrative state.55
Professor Barkow explores the importance of agency design in
resisting capture, particularly when dealing with asymmetrical political
pressure.56 Professor Marisam suggests that “duplicative delegations” make
it possible for the President to choose from a “menu of agencies” in
deciding which agency is best situated to do what. 57 Professor Biber
highlights the challenges faced by multi-goal agencies, and explores the
costs and benefits of various strategies to monitor and motivate such
agencies to do better.58
53

Jody Freeman & James Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARVARD L. REV. 1131 (2012); J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as
Lobbyists, 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2217 (2005); Freeman, Freeman urges coordination of
agencies
in
shared
regulatory
space,
Mar.
23,
2011,
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/03/23_jody-freeman-chair-lecture.html
54
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L. J. 955 (2004).
55
Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 746
(2011).
56
Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15 (2010).
57
Marisam, supra note 42.
58
Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2009). See also Eric Biber, The More The
Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, HARVARD
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Professor Gersen emphasizes the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction
in solving various agency problems, including bureaucratic drift, and the
impact of agency design.59 Professor O’Connell highlights the role of
rivalry between agencies with overlapping jurisdiction in encouraging
higher quality intelligence. 60 Professors Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast
describe how the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
strengthened Presidential control and simultaneously promoted domestic
policy priorities other than homeland security.61
Professor Doran explores how the fragmentation of Congressional
committee jurisdiction and parliamentary prerogatives help create
redundancy, and explores the informational efficiencies and distributive
consequences that result. 62 Professor Macey analyzes the structure and
design of administrative agencies in terms of their ability to reduce the
agency costs that exist between Congress and the bureaucrats within those
agencies, as well as to reduce the chance that “future changes in the political
landscape will upset the terms of the original understanding among the
relevant political actors.” 63 Finally, Professors McCubbins, Noll and
Weingast (McNollGast) explore how Congress can manipulate agency
design and decision rules to “stack the deck” in favor of the outcomes
favored by those responsible for drafting the legislation in question.64
To be sure, we have only described the legal literature on these
subjects. Political scientists and public administration scholars have spent
decades working on these issues.65 Despite this limitation, our abbreviated
L.
REV.
ONLINE
FORUM
(2012),
at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_868.php;
59
Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201. In Designing Agencies, supra note 52, Gersen considers at
greater length the public choice perspective on agency design, including the mechanisms of
vertical and horizontal control.
60
Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655 (2006).
61
Dara K. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, Crisis
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L.
REV. (2006) (“By moving a large set of agencies within the department and instilling them
with new homeland security responsibilities without additional budgets, the president
forced these agencies to move resources out of their legacy mandates.”)
62
Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91
Boston U. L. Rev. 1815 (2011)
63
Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
64
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431
(1989).
65
See, e.g., KAREN M. HULT, AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN
(1987); BERYL A. RADIN & WILLIS D. HAWLEY, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL
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summary of the literature makes it clear that there are both costs and
benefits to agency/regulatory redundancy. More importantly, dismissing the
status quo as “jurisdictional chaos” provides no useful insight into how best
to organize or reorganize, once there is agreement that the costs of a
particular organizational structure/agency design exceed the benefits. In
order to frame an intelligible response to that problem, one must consider
how the location and the combination of functions and goals of a public
agency affect its performance. We now turn to that issue.
III. Public Agency Design
A.
First Principles
Creating a public agency requires one to specify at least five major
institutional characteristics: (1) the agency’s substantive regulatory
responsibilities; (2) the location of the agency somewhere within the federal
government; (3) the definition of the range of activity subject to the
agency’s authority (e.g., economy-wide applicability or limitation to
selected sectors or transactions only); (4) the designation of the policy
instruments that the agency may use in carrying out its duties (e.g., data
collection and reporting, law enforcement, business and consumer
education, rulemaking, administrative adjudication, civil and/or criminal
authority); and (5) the choice of a governance mechanism (management by
a single unitary executive or a multi-member board). Of course, we do not
propose to address all of these issues in this article; we are instead trying to
give a sense of the scope and complexities that must be dealt with anytime
one creates a new public agency.
In a rough sense, the issues are similar to those considered by
Professor Ronald Coase in the Nature of the Firm. One can frame these
issues in various ways. For example, why do firms decide whether to carry
out some functions themselves v. contract with others? When firms are not
able to do something themselves, when do they use contracts v. acquisitions
REORGANIZATION: CREATING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1988); WILSON,
supra note 20; Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6; DONALD F. KETTL, SYSTEM UNDER
STRESS: HOMELAND SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2004); BERYL A. RADIN &
JOSHUA M. CHANIN, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: A POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE (2009); Zegart, supra note 44; Zegart, supra note 14; DAVID
E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 (2003). Professor Lewis, in
particular, has devoted considerable effort to these issues, focusing on the interface of
politics
and
agency
performance.
See
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/politicalscience/bio/david-lewis.
Economists have also written about these issues, but they have spent considerably
more time on the organization of private firms. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at
983-993 for a review of the literature.
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v. joint ventures? Why do firms enter some product lines and geographic
areas, and not others? Are conglomerates, which participate in multiple
independent and unrelated lines of business, a good idea or not? How
important are transaction costs (i.e., the relative costs of out-sourcing versus
internal production) and product complementarities (i.e., should a
manufacturer of mobile phones also make apps?) in defining the boundaries
of the firm?
These questions point to some of the complexities in thinking about
the “optimal” boundaries for a government agency’s substantive
responsibility. 66 The polar solutions are obviously silly: no one creates an
agency and fails to give it something to do, and there are no takers for a
“Department of Everything.” In between, the dividing lines are less
obvious: how does one decide whether a governmental agency should have
N or (N+1) or (N+10) areas of responsibility? What counts as a distinct
area of responsibility? Does it depend on whether the areas involve
separate substantive bodies of law – and how are the boundaries of
“separate substantive areas of law to be set?” Should the same agency
enforce both civil and criminal laws? Should the agency combine
legislative, judicial, and executive functions, or just two of the three – and
which two? What arrangement minimizes the possibility of capture by
those being regulated?67 What arrangement will be most appealing to the
Senators and Representatives who create the agency in the first place – as
well as those charged with oversight and budgetary authority? If another
agency already occupies part of the field, should we expand capacity at the
existing agency, add responsibility to the existing agency without
expanding capacity, or create an entirely new agency? Should we have
multiple agencies responsible for the same general area – and if so, how
should their jurisdiction be defined and enforced? If we want closer
coordination of policy and implementation, should we combine two (or
more) agencies into one, or are other strategies (e.g., creating a coordinating
council or a “czar”) more effective? What are the differing consequences of
creating a new agency, adding new functions to an existing agency, and
reorganizing governmental functions? And so on.
To address these questions, we begin with an examination of the
forces that have historically shaped the assignment of regulatory tasks to
agencies.

66

Some of these parallels are explored in Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 17 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 306
(1999). See also Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi & Schulz, The Two Dimensions of
Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 56 (2006).
67
Cf. Barkow, supra note 56.
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B.
Constructing The Regulatory Portfolio
Unlike business firms, which set the boundaries of their firms
through acquisitions, contracts, expansion and contraction, government
agencies generally acquire substantive responsibilities through one of four
paths: legislative choice; accident/fortuity; agency expansion into
unoccupied policy space; and legislative divestiture.
The simplest case is the assignment of specific functions to a
particular agency by legislative action. But even here, there are
complications, since regulatory authority may still be shared, concurrent, or
exclusive.68
Agencies can also acquire regulatory or operational authority by
accident or fortuity. An agency with capabilities originally designed to
serve one purpose may find those capabilities suitable for other analogous
purposes – e.g., “if you’ve got a hammer, why not help other agencies with
nails that need pounding?” Thus, helicopters and warships used to deliver
troops into combat also can be used to assist civilians suffering from natural
disasters, such as earthquakes or floods.
An agency’s regulatory jurisdiction may also be affected by agency
action in response to changes in business products or technology. 69
Consider privacy and data protection policies. Modern advances in
communications and information services technology have dramatically
expanded the ability of firms to collect and use information about consumer
behavior and preferences. The United States does not have an omnibus
privacy and data protection statute. Instead, we have statutes that regulate
specific sectors (e.g., health care providers’ collection and use of data) or
specific types of transactions (e.g., financial services), with regulatory
authority dispersed among the agencies responsible for administering each
of these statutes.
The resulting policy vacuum allowed the FTC to emerge as the
leading federal privacy agency, by virtue of several cases it brought against
firms that failed to fulfill promises concerning data protection.70 The FTC
68

There are numerous instances where regulatory authority is shared between a sectorspecific agency (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission in telecommunications)
and a government body with a broader generic mandate to address certain categories of
business transactions (e.g., the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the control of
mergers). Alternatively, Congress can grant concurrent authority to two agencies, as is the
case with the grant of merger control authority to the DOJ and the FTC.
69
We exclude technological developments that cause Congress to act. So, the
emergence of powered flight resulted in a new branch in the Department of Commerce,
which ultimately became the FAA.
70
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Electronics Company Agrees to
Settle Data Security Charges; Breach Compromised Data of Hundreds of Consumers, Feb.
5, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/compgeeks.shtm; Federal Trade Commission,
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also issued a staff report in December, 2010, proposing a policy framework
for handling privacy issues.71 The Department of Commerce has sought to
play a role into the same policy space, triggering a behind-the-scenes battle
for regulatory primacy, which Congress has not yet settled. 72 In like
fashion, the development of broadband networks has sparked a similar
dispute between the FTC and the FCC over which agency will oversee this
element of the communications sector.
The same dynamic has played out in operational terms within the
DOD on several occasions. Technological development invariably triggers
intense contests to determine which of the uniformed services will control
the deployment of weapons based on the new technology. Consider nuclear
weapons. The Air Force and Navy sought to occupy the relevant policy
terrain, devising solutions that were based exclusively on each service’s
area of primary expertise. The Air Force emphasized long-range bombers
and intercontinental ballistic missiles.73 The Navy built ballistic missile
submarines and acquired carrier-based aircraft with the capacity to deliver
nuclear weapons. The Army, which was not a major player in the fight,
developed intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable artillery
pieces. Congressional appropriations to each service and allocations to
particular weapon systems signaled the winners and losers of the ongoing
fight for operational dominance.
Finally, there is legislative divestiture. Perceived failure (particularly
catastrophic failure) can result in divestiture of some of an agency’s
functions, or outright closure/consolidation into another agency. As detailed
Iconix Brand Group Settles Charges Its Apparel Web Sites Violated Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act, Oct. 20, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/iconix.shtm;
Federal Trade Commission, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect
Medical and Financial Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays
$2.25 Million to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations, Feb. 18, 2009, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/cvs.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Says Mortgage
Broker Broke Data Security Laws: Dumpster Wrong Place for Consumers’ Personal
Information, Jan. 21, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/navone.shtm.
71
See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework
for
Consumers,
Businesses,
and
Policymakers,
Dec.
1,
2010,
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm
72
See Press Release, Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, Dec. 16, 2010, at
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveilspolicy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv.
73
Interestingly, the Air Force was originally unenthusiastic about ballistic missiles,
since they threatened the supremacy of the bomber, which dominated the Air Force culture.
But, it was clear that the missiles were going to be acquired, so the Air Force “faced an
awkward choice: either preserve the culture at the cost of letting the army and navy have
what may turn out to be the weapon of the century, or get on the bandwagon at the cost of
modifying the culture.” Wilson, supra note 20, at 105.
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below, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in a fundamental
reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) in the
Department of Interior; the melt-down of the financial markets resulted in
the shuttering of the OTS, and transfer of its functions to the OCC; the
devastation of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina resulted in a
reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and DHS
was created in response to 9/11.74
The different ways in which agencies acquire (and sometimes lose)
portions of their regulatory portfolio has two distinct implications. First, the
precise portfolio of responsibilities is never static – meaning that single
function/purpose agencies are exceedingly rare. Second, this dynamism is
affected by competition with rival agencies, and bureaucratic empire
building. Agencies sometimes approach legislators to request ownership of
a previously uninhabited policy area or simply seek to expropriate a portion
of a rival agency’s portfolio.75
Given these dynamics, it would be very useful to know which
factors contribute to the success or failure of particular combinations, and
the associated trade-offs. Part IV turns to this issue.
IV.
Who Should Do What: Seven Criteria
How should we decide who should do what? Based on our earlier
work, we highlight seven criteria that reflect our reading of the factors that
have historically affected agency design, location, and performance. Each
factor should be assessed at the level of the agency/department, rather than
any subdivision or bureau within the agency/department, since even facially
absurd combinations can look sensible if you drill down far enough into
each agency/department’s organizational chart.76
74

Congressional Research Service, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes
After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, Nov. 15, 2006, at
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%
20After%20Katrina.pdf
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Some agencies share policy areas with other government bodies. In other instances,
there is a common boundary, and agencies either contest the location of the property line,
or technological change causes a shift.
The process is no different than when a deed defines real estate ownership according
to the course of a river. A change in the course of the river creates predictable change (and
disputes) over who owns what. In property law, the boundary either moves along with the
river (if the change is the recent of accretion) or remains where it was originally (if the
change is the result of avulsion). This rule explains why although the Mississippi River
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bank, and Tennessee on the West bank), some of the land on the west bank is in Tennessee,
and other land on the eastern bank is in Arkansas. See State of Arkansas v. State of
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918).
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See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at 958-959 (“Consider, for example, a
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We note at the outset that the factors are “squishy,” inter-related,
and are framed at a high level of generality. We offer them in the spirit of
Weisbach & Nussim: even “relatively crude ideas. . . can help policymakers
muddle through the problems they face.”77
1.
Policy Coherence
How related and consistent are the functions that are to be
combined? In economic terms, are the functions complements or
substitutes?78 Synergies and efficiencies are more likely to result if there
are commonalities among the functions, whether derived from a common
client population, type of regulated entity, temporal or physical
commonalities (including but not limited to common inputs and/or outputs),
or even just a shared intellectual framework regarding means and ends.
Of course, policy coherence is not necessarily the highest priority –
which explains why some Departments (such as Interior and Commerce)
are little more than a collection of odds and ends.79 Indeed, the Department
proposal to have the IRS run the country’s defense system, replacing the Department of
Defense. The proposal is not as silly as it sounds. It would not mean that bespectacled
revenue agents would be parachuting into the Hindu Kush wearing night goggles,
camouflage, and pocket protectors. Instead, an intelligent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue would allow his employees to specialize. Revenue agents would specialize in
reading financial statements and soldiers would specialize in fighting. Policies under such a
proposal might very well continue much as they do today.”) With all due respect to
Weisbach & Nussim, we think the proposal is exactly as silly as it sounds. The proposal
ignores cultural differences between operators who perform these disparate functions, and
the organizational structure that both creates and reflects the distinct cultures of the IRS
and DOD.
Consider two examples that help make the point. Crime fighting and domestic
intelligence are far more tightly linked than tax collection and national defense, but cultural
and organizational factors help explain the FBI’s failings in the latter area. See generally
Luis Garicano and Richard Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics
Perspective, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 166 (2005) (“If crime fighting requires a
geographically decentralized organization with limited sharing of information and strong
individual incentives based on outputs, but national-security intelligence requires a
geographically centralized organization with extensive sharing of information and careful
screening of inputs but low-powered incentives, the organization’s geographical, incentive,
and information-sharing structure will either be an unhappy compromise or assure poor
performance of one of the two missions.”) See also RICHARD POSNER, REMAKING
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 10, 14-34 (2005). The Air Force is currently facing similar
difficulties, in trying to adapt its longstanding officer-pilot based culture to the increasing
use of UAVs. Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. Times M32 (July 8, 2012).
77
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at 997.
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The combination of complementary functions is more likely to result in synergies
and efficiencies than the combination of substitutes. Indeed, the combination of substitutes
may actually degrade overall performance if it gives rise to internal disagreements over
which function should be given primacy.
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The Department of Interior, was created in 1849 by combining the General Land
Office (from the Department of the Treasury), the Patent Office (from the Department of
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of Interior has been described as “the Department of Everything Else,” the
“Great Miscellany,” 80 a “slop bucket for executive fragments,” and a
“hydra-headed monster.” 81 John C. Calhoun predicted that “everything
upon the face of God’s earth will go into the Home Department.”82
This dynamic can also become self-reinforcing. The less coherent
the combination of functions in a Department, the easier it becomes to add
the next unrelated function or functions. The result is that some departments
becoming little more than dumping grounds (or less charitably, garbage
cans) for bureaus with non-overlapping portfolios.
Even if the purposes are related, if they are at odds with one another
the combination can lead to conflicts of interest, if not outright
schizophrenia.83 Until it was reorganized in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) in the
Department of Interior was “charged both with collecting revenue generated
by oil and gas drilling to fund the government, and with approving the
permits that generate that revenue. . . [leaving the MMS] torn between
whether to be a regulator or friend to industry.”84
State), the Indian Affairs Office (from the War Department) and the military pension
offices in the War and Navy Departments. Subsequent additions included the census,
regulation of territorial governments, exploration of the western United States,
management of the jail and water systems in the District of Columbia, management of
hospitals, universities, and public parks, and the colonization of freed slaves in Haiti.
Department of Interior History, available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/history.html
The Department of Commerce, is responsible for the census, patents and trademarks,
weather forecasts, weights and standards, and fishing, among other subjects. Jim
Kuhnhnen, Commerce Cuts Coming in Obama’s Reorganization, AP, Jan, 29, 2011, at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12792513
80
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Agencies with dual mandates, such as the Federal Reserve and the
FAA are prone to similar difficulties. Since 1977, the Federal Reserve is
charged with “promot[ing] effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.” There is an obvious
inconsistency between these goals – and the inconsistency makes the Fed
less predictable, and more susceptible to political interference.85 The FAA
is charged with “fostering air commerce,” as well as safety.86 When the
issue attracted public attention, Congress responded by modifying the dual
mandate, but the change had limited impact on the culture of the FAA.87
One should not overstate the necessity for consistency within a
single department or agency. Sound policy-making usually requires the
balancing of competing interests. Consider banking regulation, where
solvency must be balanced against consumer protection. If solvency and
consumer protection are handled by distinct agencies, each will focus on the
areas within their respective domains, and discount or ignore entirely the
other’s area of responsibility. Yet, that approach is a recipe for regular
battles between the agencies as to which should prevail on an issue that
implicates both sets of interests. A decision balancing the relevant
considerations will eventually have to be made by someone – either within
a single agency, if both functions are combined, or at a higher level if the
two (or more) involved agencies are unable to agree amongst themselves.
Obviously, the mission and location of the CFPB, and the reorganization of
MMS raise these issues in a very concrete way.88
The problem gets stickier when the interests that must be balanced
involve agencies with different goals and priorities.89 Which agency is the
Safety Board from the Department of Transportation, and the separation of the Atomic
Energy Commission into the Energy Research and Development Administration and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Such splits can create difficulties when the separated
agency is more susceptible to capture than was the case when it was part of a larger entity
with a more diversified portfolio. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible
Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 465 (1999);
Barkow, supra note 56.
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“decider” will significantly affect the outcome of any given dispute, as well
as whether particular circumstances count as “disputes.” Each agency will
predictably focus on the issues within their regulatory bailiwick, and be
more attentive to the industries and groups they deal with most frequently.
For example, we would expect DOD to focus on military preparedness and
discount environmental concerns, while EPA would likely have the
opposite tendencies. This dynamic results in predictable disputes between
agencies with conflicting goals and priorities – including the dispute over
the clean up of hazardous waste on military bases;90 the magnitude of the
risk posed to endangered species and the general population by military
training and technology;91 the environmental risks created by the Keystone
XL pipeline; 92 and the balancing of industrial development (and the
associated employment) against population health and environmental justice
claims.
2.
Branding/Credibility
A public agency’s “brand” conveys a message about the agency’s
priorities and aims to both internal and external constituencies. The brand
can become diluted and/or confused if the agency has too many
responsibilities, or if the responsibilities are not complementary and
consistent. A diluted/confused brand can create confusion for agency
personnel about which projects ought to be selected; what theory ought to
motivate the pursuit of individual matters; what decision rules should be
applied to resolve disputes; and the relative priority and seriousness of
Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park Service and the Army Corps of
Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated activities. Park service officials
complained that the engineers drained the Everglades National Park almost dry in their
efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glad country for agriculture. The Army Corps
of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and flood control for the people.”)
90
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particular projects/matters. 93 Agencies with diluted/confused brands are
more likely to be perceived as operating inconsistently.
These branding dynamics also influence agency credibility. The
better the reputation an agency has with Congress and congressional
staffers, the more likely it is to receive adequate funding, and not be
subjected to routine second-guessing/reversal. Similar dynamics apply in
court; agencies get the deference that courts think they deserve – and
reputation drives desert. Finally, the better the reputation an agency has
with the parties it regulates, the more likely it is to be able to extract a
favorable settlement without full-blown adversarial proceedings.94
The bundling of functions also influences an agency’s reservoir of
political capital. In our experience, regulatory bodies are continually
engaged in a process of accumulating and spending political capital.
Combining a function that generates political capital surplus with a function
that runs political capital deficits may give an agency greater ability to
perform deficit-prone functions that are important to the larger economy.
Conversely, an agency whose portfolio of responsibilities ensures that it
always runs a political deficit is an agency that has no constituency.95
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Such considerations help explain why agencies sometimes resist the
addition of new responsibilities, even when acceptance would result in a
greater budget and more visibility. 96 A similar dynamic explains why
agencies sometimes try to get rid of responsibilities that senior agency
personnel believe detract from the agency’s core mission.97
3.
Capacity/Capability
Agency resources are scarce, just like everything else. Assigning N
+1 functions to an agency that only has the resources (whether measured by
headcount, band-width, or credibility) to handle N responsibilities is asking
for trouble. Stated differently, an agency with multiple discrete functions
can easily find itself with too many things to do, relative to the pool of
talent that it has available. One needs a critical mass of talent to do any one
thing well; to do multiple things well requires both sufficient capacity and
continuous fine-tuning of the agency’s allocation of resources.98 Absent
such conditions, agencies will necessarily engage in policy triage. Agency
employees will respond accordingly, sorting themselves to work in
particular areas – with their choices dictated by their ambition and
enthusiasm.99 The result is that some areas will flourish and others will
languish – even if budgets keep pace with new responsibilities (which they
almost never do).100 Triage is necessary if the agency is to keep its head
96
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above water, but doing so means that “law in action” is quite different than
“law on the books.” It is also a recipe for recriminations and oversight
hearings when an issue that didn’t make the cut for regulatory attention
blows up.101
Capacity is not the same thing as capability. Capability determines
whether an agency has the tools to make good decisions, and does so. An
agency with enforcement responsibilities first needs the statutory authority
to exercise its will, and an adequate set of remedies with which to enforce
compliance. Once it is so armed, it will predictably make two types of
errors: Type I (intervening when it should not, or a false-positive), and Type
II (not intervening when it should, or a false negative). The institutional
design question is whether an agency with multiple (and potentially
competing) functions and purposes is likely to make more or fewer mistakes
– and perhaps, of which type.102
A related point. Expansion of the agency’s substantive mandate can
degrade capability, even if all else remains equal. As the agency’s authority
grows, its leadership and staff may acquire an exaggerated sense of the
institution’s ability to perform effectively, and pay less attention to whether
the agency’s commitments match its capabilities. These circumstances can
result in agency leadership “over-promising and under-delivering.” A
related problem is that the more expansive an agency’s mandate, the more
likely it is that Congress will turn to the agency to address developments
that do not fit neatly elsewhere – even if those problems do not actually
play to an agency’s strengths. Thus, an agency with expansive powers
becomes a default option for handling the latest problem, regardless of
whether the agency’s actual capacity and capabilities supply effective
means for achieving a good solution.103
Capability is also influenced by the degree to which agency
personnel self-critically assess both means and ends. When a single agency
has sole responsibility, the risks of groupthink and tunnel vision increase.
When multiple agencies share responsibility for a particular area, there is a
merely shifts the problem to a less transparent setting for resolution. The funding/resource
allocation problem is necessarily less visible if it is resolved within a single agency.
Barring a whistle-blower, external constituencies will never learn the details of who wanted
what – and what is no longer being done with the same enthusiasm, if at all.
101
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feedback loop for surfacing and resolving disagreements regarding such
matters, at the cost of having the dispute spill into public view. The
controversy over the desirability of drone strikes in Pakistan exemplifies
this dynamic.104
4. Resilience: Is the Existing Assignment of Functions Adaptable
and Sustainable?
Statutes routinely allocate jurisdiction according to the technology
used to supply a product or the status of the organization that provides the
service. What happens when the character of the industry is altered by
technological change or the emergence of new categories of suppliers of the
sector’s goods or services? Regulatory jurisdictional boundaries can shift
over time in much the way that the movement of a river will sometimes
alter rights in real property.105 When such changes take place, multiple
agencies may seek to exercise authority by arguing that the reconfigured
industry falls within their purview. A sustainable assignment of functions
will be able to adapt to such changes; a non-sustainable assignment will not,
making bureaucratic warfare between the rival agencies a very real
possibility.106
Examples of this phenomenon are easy to find. The SEC and CFTC
waged a decade-long dispute over products that arose at the interface of
their respective regulatory authority. 107 Financial services regulation
routinely raises this problem, because regulatory authority is usually tied to
the type of entity being regulated, and not the type of product being
offered.108 (The CFPB represents an obvious counter-example, which we
address below). Border disputes can easily trigger a vicious bureaucratic
turf war, diverting attention from substantive concerns – particularly when
the terms on which the dispute is resolved can trigger dramatic shifts in the
allocation of regulated firms across agencies. An adaptive regulatory
framework would clearly allocate regulatory authority over a particular area
104
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to a specific regulatory agency -- instead of forcing personnel at multiple
agencies to spend considerable time and effort disputing the allocation of
responsibility.
Resilience is obviously not as important as some of the other factors,
because problems will only emerge over time, if at all. But, the absence of
properly defined jurisdictional boundaries will eventually lead to border
wars between agencies/departments, and turf wars among congressional
committees. Creating an adaptable and sustainable grant of regulatory
authority helps reduce the amount of time spent on such activities.
5.
Cohesion
When discrete functions are combined in a single agency or
department, the result is usually the creation of separate operating units for
each function. As individual operating units become more specialized and
autonomous, they quickly develop norms, goals, and priorities that
predictably differ from other units in the same agency or department. Over
time, this process results in units being staffed by personnel whose interests,
training, and abilities focus narrowly on the work of their unit and have
little understanding of the backgrounds and activities of other units
underneath the same institutional roof. Predictably enough, individual units
start to see one another as rivals for prestige, headcount, and budgetary
resources.
This rivalry is usually either beneficial or destructive.109 A final
possibility is there will be neither beneficial nor destructive rivalry;
individual units will simply not acknowledge the existence of the other
units. Issues of culture and history loom large in determining which of these
three outcomes will result.
To be sure, such difficulties are likely to arise whether we are
dealing with a single agency or multiple agencies that are expected to
coordinate their efforts. And, such difficulties can exist within a single
department.110 But, matters are often much worse across divisions within a
single agency or department, such as the legendary conflicts between the
rival military services contained within a single Department of Defense:
It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy
at that time were vying for who would have the primary
mission of the strategic defense of the country. The Air
109
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Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy was advocating
its ballistic missile submarines and putting nuclear capable
aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. The debate was heated and
there was not enough money to do both. The future missions
of both services were at stake. An Air Force Colonel was
briefing General LeMay on the Soviet threat versus the
strategic requirements funded in the budget. The Colonel
told General LeMay that the Russians, our enemy, were
capable of . . . and at that point General LeMay stopped him.
LeMay was quoted as saying, “The Russians are our
adversary. The Navy is our enemy.”111
Other examples of inter-service attitudes (and their consequences)
are not hard to find. The Air Force is responsible for close air support of
ground operations, but, air force culture is “based on flying highperformance fighters and long-range bombers, especially the latter.”112 Not
surprisingly, the Air Force historically gave “minimal attention to close air
support and buys just enough attack aircraft to protect its claim to the close
air support mission. Meanwhile, the Army, unsure that it can rely on Air
Force support when it is needed, purchases a vast fleet of attack helicopters
which, while more expensive than attack planes and potentially far more
vulnerable, can be placed under direct Army command.”113
To summarize, the coordination of functions and responsibilities
will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus are combined
into a single department.114 Indeed, the more each bureau attempts to build
esprit de corps and signal that it is truly elite, the less likely “joint-ness” will
result. Such dynamics have long complicated attempts to deploy “special
ops” teams from different branches of the military in an integrated fashion –
particularly when one adds in that special ops has collectively been long
regarded with collective suspicion by the “regular” military. When one adds
the CIA into the mix, it is easy to understand why joint-ness has been such a
challenge.115
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In like fashion, the CIA has had a long-standing cultural conflict
between analysts and field agents, as well as ongoing debates between
internal communities that favor either reliance on high technology
monitoring systems (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) or “Humint” (on the
ground in-person collection of intelligence). 116 Those who design and
manage intelligence gathering through advanced technology systems tend to
have backgrounds in science and engineering. The human intelligence
community tends to be drawn from individuals with skills in the social
sciences. Not surprisingly, each individual unit believes it has a monopoly
(or near-monopoly) on the optimal approach to intelligence gathering and
analysis, and the efforts of other units are viewed with disdain. The problem
is not limited to the uniformed services: the U.S. Forest Service has
experienced similar difficulties as it has expanded from an agency staffed
solely by foresters to a more diversified ecosystem.117
As these examples illustrate, the combination of related functions
within a single department or agency does not mean that good things will
inevitably result. Indeed, destructive rivalry can mean that 2+2 = 1, instead
of 4.
6.
Collateral Effects on the Regulatory Ecosystem
The government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies
and inter-agency working groups, departments and commissions, and many
of these institutions have overlapping authority. The fact of overlapping
authority typically elicits effort by the agencies with shared jurisdiction to
2011, at http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killed-bin-laden20110502; Greg Miller & Julie Tate, CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets, WASH. POST, Sep
1, 2011 at A1 (“Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs, but the operation was
carried out under CIA authority, planned in a room at agency headquarters and based on
intelligence gathered over a period of years by the CTC. The assault was the most highprofile example of an expanding collaboration between the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special
Operations Command, which oversees the nation’s elite military teams. Their comingling
at remote bases is so complete that U.S. officials ranging from congressional staffers to
high-ranking CIA officers said they often find it difficult to distinguish agency from
military personnel.”)
116
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coordinate their efforts.118 These efforts do not arise because the agencies
in question like each other.119 But, agencies generally come to realize the
need, at least on some level, to avoid destructive duplication and to invest in
joint activities. In ways that are usually invisible to external observers,
agencies will spontaneously create a vibrant and interlocking ecosystem of
cooperation.120
When circumstances change (i.e., when regulatory tasks are
reallocated, or a new agency is inserted into the mix, or new powers are
given to an existing agency), the regulatory ecosystem is likely to be
disrupted. The new entrant may siphon off money and personnel, making it
difficult for incumbent agencies to perform their existing responsibilities.
Reallocation of authority may also upset long-standing understandings that
formed the basis for fruitful inter-agency collaboration. The entrant may
receive a substantive mandate whose formal commands resemble the
language that appears in the statutes of other regulatory authorities. The
interpretation of the new entrant’s mandate in one judicial could spill over
into the interpretation of the mandates of other agencies in separate cases.
To be sure, Congress certainly has the authority to close down an
agency entirely, or substantially limit its jurisdiction and authority – and it
knows how to do that when it wants to. But, the kinds of regulatory
reorganizations we have been describing usually do not reflect that
objective – meaning that the damage to the regulatory ecosystem is often an
unintended consequence of Congressional failure to understand that
personnel would migrate to the new and more glamorous and higher paying
outpost – leaving other parts of the regulatory ecosystem permanently
blighted. To summarize, the wisdom and net functional benefits of any
specific realignment of regulatory authority will depend heavily upon
118
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whether the changes build upon a sophisticated understanding of the
existing regulatory ecology.
7.
Political Implications
Politics is a major factor in the design and location of government
agencies and functions, because decisions about where to place certain
responsibilities are simultaneously decisions about who will resolve certain
disputes, and, in turn, what the outcome is likely to be.121 When the House
of Representatives was considering a climate change bill in 2009, the chair
of the House Agriculture Committee made it clear he would kill the bill if it
allocated responsibility for determining whether farmers would receive
credit for “tilling and conservation practices that keep carbon dioxide stored
in the soil” to the EPA, but would allow it to go forward if responsibility for
the same task resided in the Department of Agriculture.122 The choice of
regulatory responsibility for what might at first glance appear to be a
ministerial task had real significance; “environmentalists and the bill's main
sponsors feared that the Agriculture Department might use lax standards,
which would blow a hole through the nationwide cap on carbon dioxide
emissions.” 123 When President Franklin Roosevelt’s reorganization
committee proposed that all federal loan programs should be consolidated
under the Treasury Department, FDR vetoed the suggestion, observing “that
won’t work. If they put them in the Treasury, not one of them will ever
make a loan to anybody for any purpose. There are too many glass-eyed
bankers in the Treasury.” 124 More recently, privacy advocates have
expressed skepticism about the Obama Administration’s Internet privacy
121
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proposals because the Department of Commerce is taking the lead, instead
of a more pro-consumer agency, like the FTC.125
Once regulatory authority has been allocated in the first instance,
Congressional committees defend their turf with vigor and panache. In part,
this is defensible, since there are gains from expertise. Individual members
gain knowledge and experience with an agency’s operations over a period
of years. Proposals to transfer regulatory authority to an agency that is
overseen by a different committee places that investment of intellectual
capital at risk. Legislators may also be reluctant to allow others to take
ownership of “their baby,” fearing their successors may not share their
priorities. Finally, individual members of Congress derive important
electoral advantages from the committees on which they service, including
access to campaign contributions from those who are affected by the
activities of government agencies subject to the oversight of the
committees. Oversight of a specific government agency creates a revenue
stream that flows from the affected industry to the committee’s members.
Reorganization measures that alter an agency’s powers can reduce or
eliminate the revenue stream to a given committee. This dynamic makes it
clear why Congress takes a keen interest in reorganization.126
Agency personnel are acutely conscious of these considerations, and
will dismiss out of hand organizational changes that create political
difficulties.127 When agency personnel are not sufficiently sensitive to these
dynamics, members of Congress are quick to remind them of the error of
their ways. We observed this dynamic first-hand in 2002, when the FTC
and DOJ jointly proposed to change the way in which they handled cases in
which both had jurisdiction under the Clayton Act. Among other features,
the agreement would have given DOJ exclusive jurisdiction over mergers in
the the telecommunications and media sectors, while reserving electric
power, health care, and aerospace to the FTC. Although the proposal
attracted bipartisan support and was hailed by antitrust practitioners,
business groups, and former FTC and DOJ personnel, it was ultimately sunk
by the vehement opposition of Senator Ernest Hollings, who argued that
mergers among media corporations should be reviewed by the FTC. As
chairman of the Commerce Committee, Hollings had oversight authority
over the FTC, but not over the DOJ (which fell within the jurisdiction of the
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Senate Judiciary Committee). Hollings threatened the budgets of both
agencies unless the clearance agreement was abrogated. Why was Hollings
so vehement about this issue? Presumably, he feared that the plan would
have largely eliminated the flow of campaign contributions he received
from telecommunication and media corporations, and he apparently
concluded that any new campaign contributions from electric power, health
care, and aerospace firms would not be enough to make up the deficit.128
Similar considerations help explain why the reorganization that
resulted in the Department of Homeland Security was so politically
difficult.129 These dynamics tend to freeze in place existing allocations of
policymaking power and to disable reform proposals that would move
authority away from some government agencies and give it to others.
In light of the political phenomena described here, it is tempting to
simply acquiesce in the inevitability of the existing distribution of agency
responsibility. But, major exogenous shocks can make substantial
reorganizations politically possible (if not inevitable) – at which point the
other six factors become more important in determining the allocation of
responsibilities among the various bureaus, commissions, agencies, and
departments that make up the United States government. Finally, the simple
fact there is an ongoing demand for reorganization, even in the absence of
major exogenous shocks, means that these issues are constantly in play. No
one ever permanently surrenders, and there is no final judgment rule
enforced on the disputants.130
C.
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We believe that three factors matter most in predicting the long-term
success of any given agency design: political implications, coherence, and
capacity/capability –with political support, or the lack thereof the most
important factor. An agency is doomed if it lacks a supportive constituency,
or if the performance of its duties generates crippling political opposition.131
More broadly, an agency will not be able to operate effectively if its
structure raises serious doubts about its legitimacy or increases the
vulnerability to political pressure that the performance of its duties will
arouse.
The second most important factor is policy coherence. Greater
coherence increases the likelihood the agency will define its aims more
clearly, set priorities and design programs appropriately, and develop a
well-recognized brand. Coherence makes it easier to recruit qualified staff
and build the necessary capacity to implement whatever programs are
prioritized. An agency with policy coherence is accordingly better able to
establish its credibility with external audiences, including the legislators
who will determine funding and otherwise oversee agency operations.
The third most important factor is the agency’s capacity/capability
to perform its assigned functions. A severe mismatch between the
commitments in an agency’s policy portfolio and its capacity and capability
to deliver results is likely to result in highly visible failures, of which
Congress is usually quite unforgiving. Agencies with an inadequate talent
pool and frail resources are more likely to generate poorly conceived
programs, and less likely to execute tasks effectively. The mismatch
between commitments and capacities creates a grim set of options. An
agency can engage in policy triage, in the hope there will be no disasters in
the ignored policy space and that no one cares enough about the tasks that
are being ignored to make a fuss. Alternatively, an agency can try to cover
all the assigned responsibilities with the predictable consequence of doing
few (if any) of them well.
Of course, these factors are not independent of one another: an
agency is more likely to have the necessary resources (i.e., capability) if it
has strong political supporters. An agency that slights or over-emphasizes a
portion of its regulatory portfolio is skating on thin ice unless its political
supporters are on board with that decision. Similarly, without policy
coherence, an agency is less likely to attract and maintain political support
in the first instance. Finally, there are further levels of complexity imbedded
131
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within each of the factors.132
Our typology raises other difficult questions. Are all of the factors
scalable? Are any of them? Can one compensate for weakness on one
factor with strength on another? Does one need a minimum quantum of all
of the factors to get off the launching pad? And so on. These issues must
await better data and require further research. We now turn to the
application of our 7-part framework to the CFPB.
V.
Application of Our Framework to the CFPB
Before Dodd-Frank, numerous federal and state agencies shared
regulatory responsibility for financial services.133 The regulatory status quo
resembled a century-old house that had passed through several owners; each
made changes to suit her tastes in architecture. Every new modification
took place without apparent concern for the quality of the entire structure.
The result was a jarring collision of styles that combined a colonial frame,
some Victorian turrets, a Cape Cod extension, and a modernist wing of
glass and steel.
The fragmentation of regulatory authority may have helped cause
(and may even have worsened) the 2008 financial crisis.134 Reform could
have taken several different paths. The least disruptive approach would
have given existing agencies new authority and created stronger interagency coordination mechanisms. 135 A bolder solution would have
enhanced substantive regulatory controls and consolidated regulatory
functions in a one public entity. Many observers who had studied the
existing regulatory framework and its failings preferred to replace the
existing regime with a clean design – or at least merge the SEC and
CFTC.136
132

For example, capacity is obviously affected by the allocated budget, but does it
make a difference if the agency is funded with user fees v. dedicated taxes v. general
appropriations? To what extent does the mix of funding among these choices reflect the
impact of other factors – most importantly, political support?
133
The federal regulators were Commodities Futures Trading Commission, two
Treasury Department entities (the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the Office of
Thrift Supervision), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board,
the Federal Trade Commission, the National Credit Union Administration, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
134
The issue is contested, but this view was certainly shared by a majority of
Congress. Senate Report No. 111-175, at 11 (2010).
135
On this possibility. see William E. Kovacic, The Consumer Financial Protection
Agency and the Hazards of Regulatory Restructuring, Lombard Street 19, 25 (Sept. 14,
2009)
(hereinafter
Hazards),
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/090914hazardsrestructuring.pdf
136
See e.g., Steven Rattner, Regulate, Don’t Split Up, Huge Banks, N.Y. Times A23
(Aug. 1, 2012) (criticizing Dodd-Frank’s limited simplification of financial services

38
Dodd-Frank did more than simply give existing agencies more
powers, but it rejected a complete simplification of the regulatory status
quo. Instead, the 2010 reforms took a minimalist path. Dodd-Frank retained
all but one existing financial services regulator (OTS was shuttered and its
responsibilities reallocated), while creating a new entity focused on
consumer credit (the CFPB). 137 Even this partial renovation provoked
divisive debate.138
The CFPB originated in a 2007 article by (then-Professor and now
Senator) Elizabeth Warren, who proposed creating a Financial Product
Safety Commission.139 The article expressed no opinion about the new
agency’s optimal location and simply observed that “whether it is housed in
a current agency like the CPSC or stands alone, the point is to concentrate
the review of financial products in a single location, with a focus on the
safety of the products as customers use them.”140 A second article made a
similar recommendation, while cautioning that agency capture was the
“main regulatory design challenge.”141
Although most controversy focused on the CFPB’s desirability,
there was a parallel debate over where to place the agency in the
regulatory framework). But see David Zaring, With the Volcker Rule, the More Regulators
the
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2013,
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administrative state. Should the CFPB be an independent commission
(similar to the FTC and CFTC)? If not, where did it belong – Treasury,
Justice, the Federal Reserve? If located inside an existing public body, how
independent should the CFPB be from traditional forms of oversight?142
Dodd-Frank put the CFPB inside the Federal Reserve, but insulated
the bureau from oversight by almost everyone in the federal government.143
The CFPB’s head is a single director appointed to a five-year term by the
president and confirmed by the Senate.144 The president may remove the
director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”145 The
CFPB operates outside the congressional appropriations process; it funds its
operations with fees collected by the Federal Reserve – up to twelve percent
of all fees the Fed receives. 146 CFPB rulemaking is overseen by the
Financial Services Oversight Committee (FSOC), which consists of
representatives from several government agencies, including the Fed.147
The FSOC can overrule the Bureau’s rules by a vote of two-thirds of its
members, but can not influence or limit testimony by CFPB personnel, or
overrule a decision by CFPB to bring an enforcement proceeding.
Many individual features of the CFPB are not unique. Other
regulators with broad powers, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency, are led by a single administrator. For some regulatory bodies
headed by one person, the director is appointed to a fixed term and may be
removed only for cause.148 Various financial services regulators also enjoy
substantial autonomy from the budgetary appropriation process.149 But, the
142
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combination of protections afforded by Dodd-Frank makes the CFPB
distinctive. And, the bundle of autonomy mechanisms, along with the
independent-agency-within-an-independent-agency structure, gives the
CFPB unmatched insulation from the accountability devices that limit other
federal regulators.
The CFPB enforces numerous existing statutes (e.g., Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act, Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, and Truth in
Lending Act) that govern financial services for consumers.150 The bureau
also received new statutory authority to challenge “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) involving consumer financial
services.151
In this section we benchmark the CFPB with the institutional factors
set out in Section IV, supra.
A.
Policy Coherence
The CFPB has substantial policy coherence.152 All CFPB policy
assignments seek to protect consumers in financial services transactions. Its
jurisdiction is broad and covers the extension of credit, the servicing of
loans, the taking of deposits, real estate settlement services, check-cashing,
stored payment card systems, collection services, financial advisory
services, debt collection, and consumer credit reports.153 Congress gave the
CFPB expansive authority to enforce the law, issue prescriptive trade rules,
conduct on site examinations, provide guidance to firms and consumers,
gather data, and issue reports.
There can be benefits from giving one regulator a wide array of
related policy measures and implementation tools. At the same time, the
breadth of tasks and tools creates its own perils. Each function creates a
distinctive regulatory personality, ranging from prosecutor (enforcement
actions) to cop on the beat (auditing and examinations) to teacher
(consumer and business education), scholar (preparation of research
Banking and Financial Institutions 62 (4th ed. 2009) (describing funding mechanism for the
Federal Reserve).
150
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reports), information clearing house (credit card complaint database), and
philosopher-king (rule-making). 154 Each function is performed by
employees with common training and values.
These discrete functions are likely to give rise to distinct
departmental cultures, whose differences create internal tensions.
Enforcement involves selective, ex post intervention and the identification
of wrong-doers. Auditing entails continuing oversight and monitoring more
akin to the operation of a public utility commission. The collection of
industry data and preparation of reports draws upon the skills of
researchers; these tools provide a decidedly more indirect (and, in some
cases, more time-consuming) way of shaping policy than filing cases and
issuing rules.155 The challenge for the CFPB is to develop and maintain an
internal structure and culture that maximizes the complementarities across
this range of policy tools, while minimizing the possible inconsistencies.
Other agencies have had difficulty managing this dynamic.156
The CFPB’s placement within the Fed scores less well on policy
coherence grounds. The Fed focuses on macroeconomic policy while the
CFPB focuses on consumer financial services. The Fed mostly attracts
attention when it changes monetary policy, while the CFPB is likely to
attract attention with every major case it brings, and every major rule it
announces.157 We do not slight the public scrutiny drawn to the Fed’s
routine exercise of its powers, but we believe the CFPB will attract
substantially more attention. External observers will have frequent reason to
question the coherence and relatedness of Federal Reserve and CFPB
programs considered as a single package.
B.
154
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The assignment of policy responsibilities can affect the agency’s
“brand” and determine the respect it receives from external constituencies.
A strong brand assists an agency in obtaining healthier budgetary
appropriations from Congress and in gaining greater deference from
reviewing courts.158 Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB a strong brand (consumer
advocate against abusive financial practices), and the Obama
Administration has promoted that brand (and emphasized its impact for
middle class consumers) for the past three years. 159 The high
interrelatedness of the CFPB’s regulatory responsibilities and its
consistency of purpose will help the CFPB achieve a coherent, wellrecognized brand.
The same clarity and consistency of the bureau’s brand also poses
risks. The CFPB is likely to experience a steady diet of consumer protection
cases involving unfair, deceptive, and abusive conduct. Repeated exposure
to business misconduct, coupled with a mandate to attack apparent episodes
of illegal behavior aggressively, could lead CFPB personnel to develop a
“shoot first, ask questions later” approach to enforcing Dodd-Frank.160
One way to avoid this problem is to build institutional structures that
counteract path dependent habits that inflexibly incline professional staff to
favor intervention. At the FTC, for example, the Commission receives
recommendations on consumer protection cases not only from case handlers
within the Bureau of Consumer Protection but also from the Bureau of
Economics. 161 This approach discourages consumer protection case
handlers from overlooking regulatory costs and ignoring the role of
competition and market-based responses in protecting consumer interests.
Because attorneys know the Bureau of Economics will critique their before
158
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the Commission, FTC consumer protection attorneys must acknowledge
economic considerations in recommending cases.162
The CFPB has created an economic research unit and has hired
economists with expertise in mortgage markets and consumer borrowing
decisions. What role will the economists will play in shaping the new
agency’s culture and programs? The CFPB might use economic research to
discipline law enforcement and rulemaking.163 By doing so, the agency
could resist excessive exuberance for intervention. 164 By contrast, the
agency might treat its economists as subordinate to the attorneys who draft
rules and prepare cases. These are notably different conceptions of role of
economists in a regulator with law enforcement and rulemaking powers.
One sign of the future direction of the CFPB economists is staffing.
The CFPB hired a prominent behavioral economist (Sendhil Multainathan)
as its first Assistant Director of Research. Many behavioral economists
believe insights from research in consumer psychology justify expansive
regulatory intervention into financial services markets.165 Those who are
skeptical about the implications of behavioral economics for regulatory
intervention hotly contest this view.166 The CFPB’s hiring process will
determine whether such skeptics are welcome within the agency. If the
agency defines the role of economists as providing support for intervention,
skeptics are unlikely to apply for positions in CFPB, and if they do, unlikely
to stay long enough to influence decisions.167 Law enforcement agencies
that fail to provide a home for at least some skeptics are vulnerable to
group-think, tunnel vision, empire building, and other regulatory
162
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pathologies.168 These risks are pronounced for the CFPB, given the breadth
of its substantive mandate, its powerful implementation tools, and the
absence or relaxation of institutional controls that constrain other regulatory
bodies.169 In these circumstances, the strong brand created by Dodd-Frank
may turn out to be a weakness.
We noted earlier the potential spillover effects of the CFPB’s
operations on the Fed’s brand. The CFPB’s policy portfolio and
implementing tools entail departures in form and degree from the Federal
Reserve’s historical role in financial services. The CFPB’s performance of
its responsibilities, good and bad, could blur the Fed’s efforts to brand its
work as a monetary policy technocracy. Even if the CFPB’s brand achieves
great clarity and wide public recognition, the clarity of the Fed’s brand may
be diluted.
C.
Capacity and capability
As described earlier, capacity refers to the pool of knowledge and
resources at the agency’s disposal, and capability refers to the strength of
formal powers and range of policy instruments. Because the CFPB has not
yet made enough substantive decisions for us to have a view on its
performance, we focus on capacity, and the other enabling legislation
aspects of capability.
We have already observed that the CFPB possesses a formidable
array of policy tools with which to accomplish its aims – meaning
capability is unlikely to be a serious problem. Does CFPB have the human
resources to accomplish these tasks? At first glance, it would appear that
the CFPB will enjoy relatively generous resources. For FY 2013, the
funding formula created in Dodd-Frank makes roughly $450 million
available to the new institution.170
One might think that the seemingly generous allotment of resources
means that capacity will not be a serious problem. But, Dodd-Frank created
168
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an extraordinary rulemaking burden at the same time the CFPB was
opening its doors. In its first year alone, CFPB was charged with issuing 24
rules.171 Some rules are ministerial, while others involve complex matters
of policy and procedure.172 Issuing this many rules during a year would
place a severe strain on even the most well established agency, but
imposing that obligation on an agency during its start-up period invites
disappointment. The struggle to complete a hopelessly unrealistic agenda of
tasks is an invitation for error in the formulation of specific legal
commands. Some rules have been put off, while the deadlines for others
have slipped. 173 Rules that are completed are unlikely to receive the
quantity and quality of attention they would get if CFPB’s rule-making
process were not as overloaded. Affected parties which will challenge the
rules no matter what they say will now have additional grounds for doing so
(i.e., the issued rule did not adequately consider the costs and benefits of
various alternatives because CFPB was overwhelmed).174 The CFPB had
no role in creating the impossible mandates, but the inevitable efforts to
postpone implementation or to seek extensions of statutory deadlines can
hurt the agency’s brand.
On the whole, the CFPB has fared relatively well in digging out
from under the avalanche of duties imposed by Dodd-Frank. Through a
form of regulatory triage the CFPB phased in some operations immediately
and delayed others. The new agency front-loaded the promulgation of
procedural rules that described how it will carry out its responsibilities.175
The agency also initiated a variety of public education programs176 and
established a database for consumer complaints involving credit cards and
transactions associated with mortgages, student loans, and bank accounts.177
At first, the CFPB largely “outsourced” enforcement functions to
other government bodies (such as the FTC) with shared authority to
implement financial services statutes involving practices such as debt
collection.178 Over the past twelve months, the agency has accelerated the
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tempo of its own enforcement program, announcing the prosecution of new
cases (some in its own right, others in partnerships with other public
agencies) and the opening of investigations.179 The principal early objects
of CFPB enforcement have been credit card issuers. In 2012, the agency
reached settlements with American Express, Capital One, and Discover to
resolve charges of misleading sales tactics and obtained restitution totaling
over $425 million.180 Other focal points for cases and investigations within
the past twelve months have included debt relief service providers,
mortgage lenders and brokers, mortgage insurers, and providers of student
loans.181
In its rulemaking activities, the CFPB has continued to issue rules
that describe how it will exercise its authority182 and more recently has
begun to issue rules that elaborate substantive standards.183 It seems likely
that CFPB will struggle with the rule-making process for a few years, and
will not be fully operational, in the sense of executing all of its assigned
functions for some time.
This dynamic poses risks to the stability of the political constituency
that backed CFPB so enthusiastically in the first place. When the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration failed to deliver on the high
Congressional expectations that inspired the enabling legislation in the first
place, the agency’s supporters took the lead in savaging its performance.
One prominent sponsor suggested that responsibility for automotive safety
should be given to NASA.184
The CFPB’s efforts to sequence the execution of its assigned duties
do not affect the capabilities or capacity of the Fed. However, missed
deadlines, postponements, and other implementation delays are ordinarily
taken as signs of poor agency performance, no matter how unrealistic the
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initial allocation of tasks by Congress. The stigma of failed execution
attaches to the agency, not the legislators who think that effective
implementation consists of simply telling a bureau to “make it so.” If the
CFPB acquires a reputation for missing performance targets, the Federal
Reserve’s reputation for administrative competence could be collateral
damage.
D.
Collateral Effects Upon the Regulatory Ecosystem
The CFPB’s creation will have several distinct collateral effects on
the financial services regulatory ecosystem. For the most part, these effects
will increase the cost of carrying out Dodd-Frank’s commands or impede
the realization of the statute’s aims. In ways that received little evident
attention in the legislative process, these collateral effects promise to
diminish the CFPB’s effectiveness and degrade the performance of other
institutions with responsibilities for financial services regulator.
Coordination Costs. One major consequence of Dodd-Frank will be
an increased need for inter-agency coordination. Congress consolidated
some regulatory functions but left a substantially decentralized policy
making system in place. As it established the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also
created new supervisory machinery – the FSOC -- to give other financial
services regulators some control over the CFPB’s rule making activity.185
Decentralization means that a significant amount of policy
integration will need to take place by “contract” (inter-agency coordination)
rather than “ownership” (merging all regulatory functions into one entity).
As discussed earlier, coordination costs usually are hidden from sight in the
adoption of statutes. Where agencies have common policy boundaries or
concurrent authority, new legislation ordinarily assumes that cooperation
will be frictionless and costless, but that assumption is simply wrong.
The CFPB shares authority with other public agencies.186 Shared
policy domains inevitably require the agency occupants to expend resources
to cooperate and coordinate policy decisions. The formation of the FSOC
and the exercise of its supervisory functions over the CFPB also will entail
185
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administrative expense and an expenditure of management and staff time.
To some extent, the migration of personnel from the FTC to the
CFPB – discussed below – facilitates policy cooperation. By absorbing FTC
personnel, the CFPB will better understand the FTC’s culture and
operations and can use personal relationships to accomplish coordination
tasks. FTC alumni now employed at the CFPB will be able to use personal
ties with former colleagues still at the FTC to devise common solutions to
shared policy tasks. The pre-existing personal bonds can serve to build a
constructive CFPB-FTC relationship.
Dodd-Frank directs the CFPB and its federal counterparts to enter
memoranda of understanding to organize their affairs. In January 2012, the
CFPB and the FTC signed an MOU to coordinate enforcement efforts for
shared duties for consumer financial products and services,187 and CFPB
has negotiated MOUs with other federal agencies.188 Under their MOU, the
CFPB and the FTC have cooperated on a number of projects, including the
performance of a joint “sweep” of mortgage advertisements and the
preparation of a joint roundtable on debt collection.189
Despite these coordination initiatives, the Dodd-Frank allocation of
authority seems to have created tensions between the CFPB and the FTC.
Over the past year, the CFPB has announced plans to require banks to
exercise greater scrutiny of loan terms for automobile purchase contracts.
There have been reports that the FTC has complained to the CFPB about
what the Commission views as an encroachment upon its authority for
automobile credit transactions.190 It remains to be seen how smoothly such
issues will be handled going forward.
Dodd-Frank does not command the CFPB to enter MOUs with state
governments. State governments retain considerable ability to determine the
obligations that various financial services providers must fulfill. DoddFrank contemplates that the states and the CFPB will voluntarily establish
formal or informal arrangements to coordinate law enforcement and other
policy measures. An MOU may provide a useful platform for cooperation,
187
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but even these instruments are not self-executing. Those involved will need
to exert considerable effort to create and sustain cooperative relationships,
which will place further pressure on the CFPB’s capacity.
One seldom goes wrong in overestimating the amount of effort that
agencies must devote to building collaborative mechanisms that work well
in practice. Dodd-Frank reveals no awareness that this process is neither
instantaneous nor inexpensive. It is hard enough to establish strong
interoperability and build a sense of common cause between only two
government bodies. Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to do so with a
multitude of federal and state agencies.
Personnel Migration. Dodd-Frank also has a more direct impact on
the regulatory ecosystem – specifically on the FTC. Dodd-Frank gives the
CFPB exclusive authority to issue rules relating to the statutes it enforces,
divesting the FTC of a longstanding role in this area. The CFPB also has
more powerful remedies for the areas where it shares enforcement
responsibility with the FTC. Dodd-Frank also enhanced the regulatory
powers of other financial services regulators, such as the CFTC and the
SEC.
The FTC competes with the CFPB for the same pool of lawyers,
economists and administrative professionals with expertise in consumer
protection. All of these entities need individuals with knowledge of credit
practices, facility in rulemaking and litigation, experience in public
education, and the ability to perform research. Before Dodd-Frank was
enacted, the Federal Trade Commission arguably had the most expertise in
these areas.191
The CFPB pays substantially higher salaries than the FTC. The
CFPB is not subject to the same civil service pay scale as most federal
agencies, and they are able to pay over 30% more than the FTC pays its
professionals and administrative staff. Thus, an FTC attorney whose
earnings were capped at $155,000 could earn over $200,000 at the CFPB.
The CFPB’s mandate makes lateral moves more attractive than they
previously had been to FTC officials. Dodd-Frank expanded the alternatives
available to FTC professionals with financial services expertise. The CFPB
gave the FTC’s consumer protection attorneys and economists the
opportunity to do challenging financial services work with a substantial
wage increase. For senior federal employees, the higher wage scale means
an immediate improvement in current income, Moreover, because federal
pensions typically are calculated on the basis of their top three years of
earnings in the federal system, a move to the CFPB can mean several
thousand dollars more each month of retirement income.
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The effects of these disparities are already apparent. By our current
calculations, over thirty senior FTC employees have moved to either the
CFPB or the CFTC. This accounts for only a few percent of the FTC’s total
headcount, but that modest figure does not convey the significance of the
migration. Those moving include some of the FTC’s best personnel with
skills valuable in performing financial services regulatory tasks.192 It is not
as though the FTC is unable to hire new personnel to fill vacancies. In the
current employment market, the FTC will receive hundreds of applications
for each position it posts. Many applicants have exceptional credentials.
What cannot be replaced at will is the know-how and institutional memory
specific to the implementation of the FTC’s responsibilities. This
knowledge can be restored over time, but this is a long and costly process.
The FTC could become a farm team for recruiters from the CFPB or the
CFTC.
A regulatory ecosystem perspective makes it clear that we should
account for both the gains to the financial services regulators and the losses
to the FTC in evaluating the overall impact of Dodd-Frank. The migration
of human capital was a foreseeable consequence of Dodd-Frank, yet
lawmakers gave it no weight in their deliberations.193 Dodd-Frank may
degrade the FTC’s performance, yet the harm will occur in ways not
immediately observable. The FTC will lose cases that it would have won, or
fail to rebuff a legal challenge to all or part of a rule. The agency will forego
certain projects that demand the highest skills because it lacks the means to
carry them out successfully. The FTC must either accept an inevitable
decline in its financial services work or reposition its program, based on the
new credit practices authority granted the FTC by Dodd-Frank, and the
residual authority that the FTC retains.
Federal Reserve Spillovers. The CFPB’s establishment also may
affect the Fed. Any effect on the ecosystem will be mediated through the
reputation and branding factors described previously. If the CFPB
formulates programs that are seen to be sensible and the political storms
subside, the Fed’s brand as a macroeconomic policy technocracy might be
enhanced. If the CFPB’s initiatives falter and political controversy persists,
the CFPB may reduce its host’s stature, and may subject it to the political
192
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winds from which it has long been insulated.
E.
Resilience: Is the Assignment of Functions Adaptable and
Sustainable?
Dodd-Frank’s assignment of responsibilities to the CFPB is
adaptable and sustainable, as long as the CFPB does not overreach. The
flexibility of the CFPB’s mandate and the range of its policy tools will give
the agency considerable ability to adapt to new circumstances. Perhaps the
most important likely source of broad “scalability” is the Bureau’s authority
to proscribe behavior that is “unfair, deceptive, or abusive.” The unfairness
and deception elements of this command are modeled on Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which authorizes the FTC to challenge
“unfair or deceptive” acts or practices.194 The CFPB’s mandate to reach
“abusive” conduct supplies an invitation to reach behavior beyond the
prohibitions on unfairness and deception
The FTC’s experience shows both the promise and peril of scalable
allocations of regulatory authority. The federal courts have declared that the
FTC’s unfairness authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act confers power
to reach conduct not previously condemned by statute or judicial
decisions.195 For example, the FTC’s emergence as the principal federal
enforcement body concerning data protection and privacy built upon the
application of the Commission’s unfairness authority.196
The FTC’s history also demonstrates that the application of a highly
scaleable mandate can create two distinct traps. First, legislators and other
external observers come to regard the agency as a solution for all problems
that have an apparent connection to the expansive mandate. Congress will
urge an agency with an elastic mandate to forbid “unfair” conduct to take
steps to reduce prices for products such as gasoline, even though no
measures within its control will be effective, and efforts to intervene (e.g.,
to attack price rises as “price-gouging”) may retard market responses that
eventually cure the problem.197
Second, an agency with a sweeping, adaptable mandate has
incentives to extend the boundaries of its authority, to show it is fulfilling
the goals Congress set for it. Open-ended assertions of authority invite
carelessness in implementation. Unless the agency exercises great
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discipline, it will find it tempting and easy to expand claimed authority
without rigorously testing the logic for intervention. These lapses eventually
can provoke severe political backlash, and rebukes from reviewing
courts.198
F.
Cohesion
As described above, the CFPB’s mandate involves coherent, highly
interrelated policy making tasks. Were there to be intramural rivalry or
tension, it likely would result from the diversity of policy making functions
the CFPB must perform – i.e., among those charged, respectively, with
bringing cases, issuing rules, performing research, carrying out audits, and
providing public and business education. As noted previously, this
phenomenon occurs at multiple agencies. Intramural competition for
prestige and resources can cause agency officials to spend substantial effort
refereeing disputes among rival divisions. These resources would otherwise
be applied to serve program needs.
Intramural rivalry has other costs. Where individual operating units
strive to create separate identities, personnel within those units may develop
loyalty to their own unit and define success in terms of their unit’s
chievements. Projects requiring cooperation across units may appear
relatively unimportant, or simply contrary to each group’s interests, even
though greater collaboration across units would advance projects that serve
the larger aims of the entire institution. The CFPB may find it difficult to
mobilize resources across units unless it can create a “we’re all in this
together” ethos.
That said, some dynamic tension across units can be helpful. As
noted previously, the formulation of consumer protection policy at the FTC
(including financial services) has been informed by the agency’s
economists. The Bureau of Economics (BE) is a voice for the value of
competition, for the inclusion of market-oriented strategies in the mix of
regulatory tools, and for awareness of costs of specific regulatory choices.
BE also performs empirical research that has yielded major insights into
how consumers perceive disclosures provided in financial services
instruments. BE has helped instill within the FTC a culture that encourages
ex post evaluation to measure the policy results of specific initiatives. It
remains to be seen whether CFPB will create a similar framework – and
whether a group likely to be dominated by intervention-minded behavioral
198
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economists will exercise a similar disciplining function.
What of the prospects for synergy between the CFPB and the Fed?
Dodd-Frank sought to insulate the CFPB from the Fed, but there are
considerable overlaps in substantive knowledge and expertise. The Fed has
deep expertise in credit practices related to the CFPB’s duties. Notions of
CFPB autonomy might discourage effective interaction. Similarly, if CFPB
personnel view the Fed suspiciously, owing to its perceived lapses in
oversight before the financial crisis, cooperation is likely to be seen as a
negative. We see the possibility for considerable gains from trade, but there
are policy impulses that might discourage it.
G.
Political Implications
As noted previously, the CFPB has broad authority, but Congress
dispensed with many mechanisms it has used in the past to balance agency
autonomy and accountability. The CFPB is headed by a single director, not
a multi-member board consisting of individuals of diverse political
affiliations.199 Congress also set aside the ritual of annual appropriations
and made the Bureau a fee-funded body. It placed this autonomous unit
within another government body, the Federal Reserve, which itself enjoys
substantial insulation from the political accountability methods that govern
other regulators. In general, Dodd-Frank contradicted settled practice of
tying greater accountability to increases in an agency’s power.
The CFPB was controversial to begin with, and the enactment of
Dodd-Frank did not end debate about the wisdom of these institutional
choices. For many months the White House declined to nominate a
director.200 As a temporary expedient, President Obama assigned Professor
Elizabeth Warren to manage the CFPB from a position located within the
Department of Treasury.201 Warren had played a central role in designing
the CFPB, and she had become a lightning rod for critics of the new body.
Republicans in the Congress said they would not confirm Warren or any
other nominee to be the CFPB’s director without basic changes to the
CFPB’s institutional architecture.202 These included the removal of the
CFPB from the Fed, its re-creation as a stand-alone, multimember
regulatory commission, and the use of annual appropriations to fund its
operations. In January 2012, President Obama nominated Richard Cordray,
199
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the former Attorney General of Ohio to the post.203 The nomination went
nowhere because it was clear there were insufficient votes to overcome the
promised filibuster.
President Obama sought to circumvent this obstacle by using a
recess appointment.204 This move intensified the already rancorous debate
about the new Bureau and inspired further debate about whether DoddFrank permitted a recess appointee to head the agency, and whether
Congress was actually in recess when Cordray initially was appointed.205
As part of a larger legislative deal involving the NLRB, Cordray eventually
received Senate confirmation in 2013.206
Upon taking office with his recess appointment, Cordray
immediately announced that the CFPB would apply the enforcement and
rulemaking powers granted by Dodd-Frank. The continuing political dispute
over the CFPB poses two dangers to the new agency. The delay in
appointing a director of any sort impeded the roll-out of the CFPB’s
program. Dodd-Frank specified that the Bureau could not perform certain
functions until a director took office,207 and Cordray’s delayed nomination,
and recess appointment led to delays in CFPB coming on-line. This was a
serious disadvantage for a body given an impossibly ambitious assignment
of rulemaking and other start-up tasks.
The circumstances of Cordray’s recess appointment in 2012 have
created a latent liability for work performed by the CFPB until Cordray’s
confirmation in 2013. In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that President Obama’s appointments of three
members of the National Labor Relations Board were constitutionally
invalid.208 In June the Supreme Court accepted certiorari to review the D.C.
Circuit’s decision.209 Affirmance of the court of appeals ruling could cast
doubt upon the legitimacy of Cordray’s appointment to the CFPB. If
Cordray’s appointment was invalid, there would be serious questions about
the validity of actions taken – notably, the promulgation of rules – during
the period of the Cordray’s recess appointment.210
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There is a second danger to the CFPB if political disagreements over
the future configuration and leadership of the agency are not resolved -even if the recess appointment of Cordray is ultimately upheld. No
regulatory agency can prosper without an essential foundation of political
support, and the CFPB faces an enormous challenge to build the political
capital it will need to succeed. The active implementation of the Bureau’s
regulatory tools can be expected to create backlash of the sort that many
regulatory agencies experience. On many occasions, Congress has granted
broad, nominally powerful authority and then stepped forward to protect
affected firms that complain about overly “aggressive” applications of that
authority.211 Every day of the week agencies collect or spend political
capital. Without a positive balance to respond to future political attacks, the
CFPB will find it difficult to build and maintain an effective program.
The rancorous political debate accompanying the birth of the CFPB
does not bode well for its future. We expect many Republican members of
Congress will jump on every opportunity to attack the CFPB, and use those
opportunities to try and revisit the design choices made in Dodd-Frank.212
Even if formal changes are not forthcoming, various forms of equilibration
are possible. Courts, for example, could choose to exercise more stringent
review of CFPB rules, even while professing to adhere to standards
mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Congress could choose to
demand more frequent appearances by CFPB leadership to explain and
defend the agency’s programs. Congress also has many other ways to make
life difficult for agencies that displease it, and the CFPB starts deep in the
hole on that score.213
To date, the political brawl over the CFPB has not spilled over to the
Federal Reserve. Whether disputes over the CFPB affects the Federal
Reserve will depend greatly on two factors: the performance of the CFPB
going forward, and the skill of the Federal Reserve in creating a distance
between its core brand and the brand of its involuntary tenant.
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H.
Scoring the CFPB
How does the CFPB do on the factors we have identified? The
CFPB does well on four factors (policy coherence; branding and credibility;
resilience; cohesion), fares poorly on two (collateral effects on the
regulatory ecosystem; political implications), and presents a mixed picture
on one factor (capability/capacity). On the three factors that we have
identified as most important, the CFPB does well on one (policy
coherence), mixed on a second (capability/capacity), and poorly on the third
(political implications).
It is far too early to draw conclusions about the performance of so
young a government body, but we offer three tentative predictions. To be
sure, there are no guarantees in life or in agency design -- luck, history,
culture, and the decisions made by senior agency personnel, both at the
outset and in moments of crisis, all play important roles, and will affect
whether the CFPB becomes a durable part of the regulatory architecture for
financial services.
First and most importantly, the CFPB’s design builds in
vulnerabilities that will likely prevent it from fulfilling the expectations of
its creators. Second, the effort to insulate the CFPB from political
interference will likely embroil it in recurring struggles with Congress over
accountability for its policies, and may well spill over and damage the
Federal Reserve. Third, the existence of the CFPB will likely undermine the
effectiveness of the FTC.
VI.
A Case Study of PPACA
Dodd Frank was not the most significant legislative initiative of
President Obama’s first term. Far more significant was the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), which mandated dramatic
changes in the financing and delivery of health care in the United States.
The challenges associated with PPACA’s implementation provide a useful
“real-time” case study that complements our analysis of the CFPB. Because
we anticipate writing another article on the subject, we only sketch out a
few of the issues here.
By common consensus, the roll-out of the website,
www.healthcare.gov, has been a complete disaster.214 The website, which
was intended to provide a seamless portal to the exchanges that were a
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centerpiece of PPACA, crashed the instant it was launched. 215 Top
administration officials initially attempted to portray the website’s failure as
a success story, resulting from high demand and a few “glitches.” 216
Eventually, the administration grudgingly acknowledged the problems, and
promised to make the website “work smoothly for the vast majority of
users” by the end of November, 2013.217
Since then, the performance of the front-end of the website has
improved dramatically, but serious questions remain about a wide array of
other issues, including the extent to which administration officials knew the
website was not ready for prime time, while making public statements to the
contrary;218 the quality of the information that is being provided to insurers
after it is collected by the website;219 continued technical problems with the
website;220 the failure to build in robust security protections for the private
health care information that is collected by the healthcare.gov website;221
215
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the decision by the administration to overrule its internal privacy expert,
and launch the website without the necessary security protections;222 and
the refusal to release timely information on the number of people that have
actually secured coverage through healthcare.gov.223 The website launch
has not been the only implementation challenge; the administration has had
to repeatedly announce delays and modifications to PPACA (often without
explicit statutory authority).224 And, the states have faced implementation
challenges of their own – which have been compounded by the ad hoc
delays and modifications announced by the administration. 225 Elected
officials and commentators from across the political spectrum have harshly
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criticized the website and the roll-out of PPACA.226
How did we find ourselves in this mess? The governmental design
issues we analyze in this article played an important role. Immediately after
PPACA was enacted, the Obama administration recognized that
implementation would be challenging, and put together a “high level team”
to implement what “one insider described as an ‘elaborate implementation
plan.’”227 One month later, an outside expert close to the administration
(Professor David Cutler) sent a confidential memo to a senior
administration official, warning that their implementation strategy was
deeply flawed and likely to fail.228 More specifically, Cutler was very
concerned that “the personnel and processes you have in placed are not up
to the task, and that health reform will be unsuccessful as a result.”229
Cutler stated that “the early implementation efforts are far short of what it
will take to implement reform successfully.”230 More specifically, he wrote,
“for health reform to be successful, the relevant people need a vision about
health system transformation and the managerial ability to carry out that
vision.”231 In bold-faced type, Cutler then wrote, “I do not believe the
relevant members of the Administration understand the President’s
vision or have the capability to carry it out.”232 For PPACA to work, the
White House would have to set up “a new structure to focus on where it
needs to go” and not to pile “new responsibilities onto a broken system.”233
226
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Cutler concluded with a call for urgent changes: “I strongly encourage you
to make changes now, before you are too late to get the outcomes we
need.”234
Cutler’s memo provides his perspective on the institutional
dynamics that resulted from the assignment of implementation
responsibility for PPACA to HHS, and within HHS to the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services. Indeed, Cutler identified this decision as “a
central concern.”235 Cutler paints a dismal portrait of CMS: “the agency is
demoralized, the best people have left, IT services are antiquated, and there
are fewer employees than in 1981, despite a much larger burden.”236 Cutler
cuttingly continues, “you have an agency where the philosophy of health
system reform is not widely shared, where there is no experience running a
health care organization, and where the desire to move rapidly is
lacking.”237 Worse still, HHS and CMS displayed little understanding of
what it would take to make the health care exchanges work properly.238
Cutler further observed that problems were not limited to the
operational level:
The overall head of implementation inside HHS, Jeanne Lambrew,
is known for her knowledge of Congress, her commitment to the
poor, and her mistrust of insurance companies. She is not known for
operational ability, knowledge of delivery systems, or facilitating
widespread change. Thus, it is not surprising that delivery system
reform, provider outreach, and exchange administration are
receiving little attention. Further, the fact that Jeanne and people like
her cannot get along with other people in the Administration means
that the opportunities for collaborative engagement are limited, areas
of great importance are not addressed, and valuable problem solving
time is wasted on internal fights.
Cutler concludes his memo with recommendations for “a major change at
HHS,” including “a revamped and enhanced implementation group.” 239
The new team would include individuals with expertise in managing large
and complex enterprises, health care payment reform, information
technology systems, outreach and education to reach health care providers
and insurers, and state coordinators.240
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The advice in Cutler’s memo was ignored. Of course, Cutler was not
focusing on the risk of website failure. And, even if the Administration had
heeded Cutler’s advice, there is no guarantee that the same problems (or
other, more severe problems) would not have materialized. But, it is striking
that Cutler’s memo highlights the importance of two of the three factors that
we have identified as most important (e.g., coherence and
capacity/capability). And, it is equally striking that one of the proposed
“fixes” now being considered for addressing the dysfunction of the federal
health insurance marketplace is to transfer authority away from CMS to a
“CEO-type figure with clear authority and knowledge of how insurance
markets work.”241
Cutler does not mention politics – the third of the three factors we
have identified as most important. Politics would have created a hostile
environment in which to launch PPACA even if the best management team
in the world had been in charge of its implementation – which was clearly
not the case. 242 Only naked political calculation can explain the
administration’s decision to assign implementation responsibility for
PPACA to CMS; to delay many of the implementation decisions and
enabling regulations until after the 2012 election (and disclosure of some of
those decisions, even when they had been made before the 2012 election);
and to give upbeat presentations promoting the roll-out, and hide all
evidence that things were not going well.243 Indeed, one prominent staffer
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defended such tactics on political grounds: “Some Democrats said that,
given the Republican assault on the measure, the White House was right to
deliver upbeat presentations promoting it. ‘To downplay expectations would
have fed into the Republican narrative,’ said Jim Manley, a former top aide
to Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader, who attended a
session in the Roosevelt Room of the White House with other allies of the
administration.”244
It is too early to tell how the political winds will affect the future of
PPACA, and the agencies charged with its implementation. But, if PPACA
cannot deliver on the promised benefits in short order, we predict the
emergence of a (likely bipartisan) coalition for retooling (and maybe even
repealing) large portions of the PPACA. The probability of this occurring is
significantly higher if (i) the exchanges fail to enroll sufficient numbers of
healthy individuals (which will trigger an increase in the cost of coverage,
rather than the decrease repeatedly promised by President Obama), with
consumers receiving notice of those rate increases immediately before the
mid-term election in November, 2014; or (ii) large numbers of people lose
their grandfathered coverage, and find the new coverage unsatisfying (either
because it is too expensive, or because they are unable to continue seeing
their preferred doctors); or (iii) there is a significant breach in the privacy of
the information collected by healthcare.gov. Of course, this is only a short
and highly selective list of three readily identifiable risks to PPACA; other
known and unknown risks will emerge (or not) over time.
Finally, PPACA’s flawed implementation poses risks to the
reputation of the regulatory state as a whole.245 If PPACA fails to meet its
publicly announced goals, the decline in public confidence is likely to be
generalized, and will affect the functioning of the government well beyond
the PPACA and health care.
VII. Implications for Administrative Law
To this point, we have focused on describing our analytical framework,
and applying it to the CFPB and the PPACA. In this section, we briefly note
the implications of our analysis for administrative law. More specifically,
do our findings have any implications for the endless debates over
Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference? In our view, if the basis for deference
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is expertise, then the details of agency design should matter in deciding
whether an agency is, in fact entitled to deference. Indeed, even if the stated
basis for deference is democratic legitimacy (i.e., Congress delegated a task
to the agency, and the court is required to defer to that delegation), that only
moves the inquiry one level down – since the primary reason for Congress
to have delegated an issue to a particular agency is because of its
expertise.246
To be sure, tying the degree of deference to the ever-changing
details of agency design makes the doctrine even less predictable than it is
already.247 But, if the justification for deference is expertise, it is hard to
understand why one would ignore the question of whether the agency, in
fact, has such expertise.248
VII.
Conclusion
In previous work, we identified seven factors that we believe are
helpful in determining whether the combination of particular functions
and/or goals within a single government agency or department is likely to
work out well or poorly. When we apply these seven factors to the CFPB,
we find that it scores well on several factors, but exceedingly poorly on
others. It remains to be seen how things will play out, but our analysis
suggests future difficulties are likely. Our brief discussion of the
implementation difficulties with PPACA suggests similar dynamics are
likely to dog health reform going forward.
In Washington, it has long been a truism that “personnel are policy.”
We believe that it is equally (if not more) a truism that “placement is
policy.” Where an agency is located, and what its street-level operators do
on a day-to-day basis has a profound influence on the policies that will
result. Time and again, one finds that the culture of a department, bureau,
agency, and commission has a disproportionate impact, irrespective of the
politics of the person who happens to be temporarily residing at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.
Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano
candidly admitted that when he served in the Johnson White House, “often
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we didn’t know where to put a program. . . and we didn’t particularly care
where it went; we just wanted to make sure it got enacted.”249 For too long,
legal scholars have taken an equally casual attitude toward the issue of
agency design, and instead focused on case studies of individual agencies
and the “greatest hits” of administrative law (e.g., delegation of powers,
judicial review of agency actions, and the procedural requirements of
administrative rulemaking and adjudication). Every taxi driver in
Washington D.C. may know that “government organization has serious
implications for policy outcomes,” but the majority of legal scholarship on
the administrative state demonstrates little attention to this simple point.250
Stated bluntly, agency design has long been the Rodney Dangerfield
of administrative law: it gets no respect.251 We think it is time for the issue
of agency design to command greater attention – particularly from those
who find fault with our analytical framework, or have a more optimistic
spin on the CFPB and the implementation of PPACA. Who does what
matters – and sometimes it matters more than everything else combined.
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